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Abstract 
The political changes that took place in East and Central Europe during the 
end of the 1980s and at the beginning of the 1990s had a huge impact on the security 
structures in Europe. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and its legitimacy was 
challenged when the former Soviet Empire started to crumble. This thesis addresses 
NATO's response to this legitimacy challenge. It is argued in the thesis that the response 
came in a two stage process. The first response was a debate where different reasons 
were given for NATO's continued existence. The thesis focuses only on the justifications 
used to maintain the organization. It was found that there were external and internal 
justifications and that the people partaking in the debate could be labelled either as 
belonging to the neorealist school or to the neoliberal school in the field of international 
relations. Neorealists tended to use more external justifications for keeping NATO. The 
external justifications are based more on threats than possibilities. It was argued that 
despite the absence of the Warsaw Pact, there were still threats that made NATO 
necessary. Neoliberal institutionalists used both external and internal justifications, but 
stressed the opportunities and NATO's positive effects as an international institution. 
The second response to the legitimacy challenge posed to NATO was a 
process of change where both new ways of thinking and new ways of structuring the 
organization emerged. Both schools of thought agree that NATO was adapting to the new 
reality, but used their own arguments from the first stage when explaining the changes. 
The conclusions drawn from the thesis are that NATO is needed as a 
security actor in Europe, and that the changes that NATO has undergone have been the 
right ones to satisfy both those who fear future conflicts and those who want to work for 
enhanced security. It is also concluded that in order to understand NATO's two 
responses, it is essential to study arguments from both schools of thought. The two 
ii 
schools have good arguments and they complement each other which makes an analysis 
covering both fruitful. 
NATO survived the legitimacy challenge and has recently decided to accept 
three new members in 1999. The process of change has not been an easy one for NATO, 
but the organization has without any doubt kept the position as the most important 
security actor in Europe. It is very likely that it will continue to keep that position for a 
long time to come. 
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Introduction to the Thesis 
I. Introduction 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is undergoing a period of profound 
metamorphosis. The political changes which took place in Europe in the end of the 1980s 
were extensive, and to a large extent, unexpected. No one ever imagined that the communist 
system in Eastern and Central Europe would fall apart so quickly. Even though many people 
in the West cheered this so-called victory, it also posed new problems. Well-established 
security structures were undergoing major changes because of the political changes which 
culminated in the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) and the 
disintegration of the former Soviet Empire. What these changes will mean for security in 
Europe has only recently begun to become clear to the world. Four decades of East-West 
ideological power struggle have come to an end. There is no longer a bipolar world where 
capitalism is head to head against communism in a manner that threatens the world with war 
and mass-destruction. As a result, there has been a decrease in military tension among the 
major powers in the world. This decrease in tension has strengthened the need and the will to 
redefine the concept of security.' 
The traditional view of security concentrates on politico-military security concerns. 
The central actor is the state, and the fundamental threat to the state is the actions that 
threaten the sovereignty and independence of the state? The ultimate threat is war. This 
traditional view of security, which has been prevalent for most of the Cold War, is slowly 
1 See Nils Andren, "Thinking about a New European Structure", in (eds.) Armand Clesse and Lothar Ruhl, 
Searching for a New Security Structure in Europe (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1990), pp. 
89-90. See also Charles Fricaud-Chagnaud, "In Search of a New Formulation of the Concept of European 
Security ... " Ibid., pp. 213-214. 
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changing, even though there are many different opinions. Ole Weaver has studied the 
evolution in perceptions of security and argues that the definition of the concept has not been 
a constant. Since World War II, the concept of security has evolved and transformed into a 
coherent and recognizable field of study where more and more people address the task of 
defining security: 
In this process of continuous, gradual transformation, the strong military identification of earlier 
times has been diminished - it is in a sense, always there, but more often in a metaphorical form, 
as other wars, other challenges - while the images of "challenges to sovereignty" and defense 
have remained central.3 
The strong military identification that Weaver is talking about has especially diminished 
since the end of the Cold War due to the demise of the Warsaw Pact and the disintegration 
of the Soviet Union. Barry Buzan recognizes this, as well, when he notes that the end of the 
Cold War has taken the "spotlight from military power as the core determinant of 
international order and security, and opened up more space for the operation of economic, 
political and societal forces". 4 Similarly, Ken Booth states that armed forces will still exist, 
but that they will be less relevant as war-making institutions. He also says: 
Increasingly their (the armed forces) utility will be at low levels of violence- combating terrorism 
and drug-exporting, for example, or controlling migrations. At higher levels of violence their 
utility will be increasingly ritualistic, like a caveman's fire to scare away dinosaurs.5 
This changed role for the military has fueled the never-ending effort on the part of 
academics and policy makers to re-define security and to make the concept broader. The 
attempts to re-define security commenced in the 1970s, but until the mid and late eighties the 
2 Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), pp. 51-120. 
3 Ole Weaver, "Securitization and Desecuritization" in (ed.) Ronnie D. Lipschutz, On Security (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1995), p. 50. 
4 Barry Buzan, "Security, the State, the 'New World Order', and Beyond" in (ed.) Ronnie D. Lipschutz, 
On Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), p. 196. 
5 Ken Booth (ed.), New Thinking about Strategy and International Security (London: Harper Collins 
Academic, 1991 ), p. 338. 
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debate about alternative definitions of security was held in the margins of the field of 
international politics, and was not taken very seriously.6 Five international commissions led 
by Willy Brandt, Inga Thorsson, Olof Palme, Gro Harlem Brundtland and Julius Nyerere 
each tried respectively to broaden the concept of security to include social, economic and 
environmental issues as well.7 They helped to spread the idea that security is more than 
military aspects. These new interpretations have gained in strength from the increasingly 
relaxed relations between the superpowers which commenced in earnest during the latter 
part of the 1980s. When Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in the Soviet Union in 1985, the 
idea that security could be something more than the traditional interpretation began to win 
acceptance on a broader scale than before. This process of re-defining security was given a 
push by the declaration of the United Nations (UN) Security Council Summit given January 
31 , 1992: 
The absence of war and military conflict among States does not in itself ensure international 
peace and security. The non-military sources of instability in the economic, social and 
humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats to peace and security.8 
The collapse of the Soviet Union has also had the effect that the states of the world 
are now trying to identify the new international political structure of which they now are 
part. Can it be said that the world is a unipolar one led by the United States of America, or is 
it an increasingly multipolar world where ideologies play a minor role and where economic 
factors have become more important?9 Some would even argue that a whole new security 
6 Ibid., p. 335. 
7 Douglas Roche, "From Conflict to Community" in (eds.) C.G. Jacobsen, M. Spencer, E.L. Tollefson, 
World Security- The New Challenge (Toronto: Canadian Pugwash Group, 1994), p. 4. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
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structure is slowly being built to replace the old structures. 10 
When the Cold War ended there was a common perception that the world had 
become safer and more stable. 11 At the same time, certain aspects of stability were erased 
when the former Soviet Union dissolved. 12 This contradiction has preoccupied security 
experts. Generally, well-known patterns create stability and security. In this case, a whole 
system disintegrated, creating a situation in which the threat of war in Europe diminished 
radically, but the side effect of a shattered Soviet Empire was that the well-known patterns 
disappeared. The former Eastern bloc tried to get rid of an inflexible and corrupt political 
system and replace it with a Western-based democratic system. The lack of experience 
together with a poor economic base has brought about severe hardships. The unstable 
economic, political and social situation in these countries constitute the greatest source of 
insecurity in Europe today. 13 
NATO, a product of the Cold War, was established in 1949 to protect Western 
Europe against a perceived communist military and political expansion. During the Cold 
War the ideological and military structures hardened with NATO in the West and the WTO 
in the East. Time passed, political leaders changed, minor wars were fought (influenced by 
the major powers), but the basic struggle never changed. There were attempts to thaw the 
cold relations that characterized the Cold War, but the results were mixed. It seems as if the 
10 SeeR. Seidelmann, "Towards a Common European Security Policy" in (eds.) Cristoph Bluth, Emil 
Kirchner and James Sperling, The Future of European Security (Brookfield, USA: Dartmouth Publishing 
Company, 1995), pp. 113-114.; See also Carr and Ifantis, NATO in the New European Order (New York: 
St. Martin's Press, 1996), pp. 15-16. 
11 Johan Jorgen Holst, The Future of NATO (Oslo: The Norwegian Atlantic Committee, 1993), p. 4. 
12 See Weaver, 1995, pp. 61-62. See also Mark Kramer and Richard Smoke, "Concluding Remarks" in (ed.) 
Richard Smoke, Perceptions of Security (New York: Manchester University Press/St. Martin's Press, 1996), 
pp. 281. See also Trevor Taylor, European Security and the Former Soviet Union (London: The Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, 1994 ). 
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last attempt, that began with President Gorbachev, was the one that slowly led to the 
revolutionary changes we have seen. After it was clear that the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan was a very expensive venture both in lives, political goodwill and money, the 
Soviet leadership showed signs of a willingness to improve relations, especially since the 
domestic economic situation was strained. Relations between the two blocs slowly improved 
when President Gorbachev, wanting to reform parts of the Soviet system, agreed to withdraw 
all troops from Afghanistan. At the same time, President Reagan stopped stressing his plans 
of a Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). 
Cracks, caused for example by increasing unrest and protests among the people living 
in the East, began to appear in the walls surrounding the communist countries as the 
economic situation grew worse. The cracks were allowed to expand when the Soviet 
leadership decided to refrain from using the usual harsh methods, with which they used to 
respond to domestic unrest in the past. Finally, the walls fell down, which surprised people 
immensely, and which made them question the purpose of NATO. Without these events this 
thesis would not have been written. 
The purpose of this introduction chapter is to introduce the reader to the thesis. First, 
the theoretical framework used in this thesis is presented followed by the aim of the thesis. 
Finally, there are definitions of the concepts that are used throughout the thesis. 
II. Aim of the Thesis and the Theoretical Framework 
NATO found itself in a totally new situation in the late 1980s. Four decades of 
13 Kramer and Smoke, 1996, pp. 290-291. 
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ideological battle shaped by military rearmament had formed NATO into a military 
organization ready to defend the West against a conventional attack, and ready to deter a 
Soviet nuclear assault. However, the defence alliance was not prepared to meet the new 
challenges that developed after the fall of communism in Eastern and Central Europe 
beginning in 1989. The fact that the Warsaw Pact dissolved in February 1991, and the fact 
that the Soviet Union disintegrated after the coup in August of the same year, only added to 
the urgent feeling that NATO needed to change if it were to survive as a collective defence 
alliance. 
It is argued here that the events that took place, and which ended the Cold War, 
challenged the legitimacy of NATO, as the threat perception upon which it was based, and 
its raison d'etre, had altered significantly. In response to the legitimacy challenge, NATO 
has evolved. The question being asked in this thesis is: what was NATO's response to the 
legitimacy challenge? It was discovered when trying to answer the question that NATO's 
response to the legitimacy challenge came in a two stage process that can be described as 
why? and how?. Why did people (politicians and academics) want to keep NATO, and how 
did the organization adapt? This thesis will address the debate (which occurred as a response 
to the events in Eastern and Central Europe) dealing with the reasons for maintaining 
NATO, and which worked as the foundation for the actual changes that took place later. 
NATO's response to the legitimacy challenge has been addressed according to the two stages 
(each presented in a chapter) in this thesis. Here follows a brief review of the stages. In order 
to study these two stages a theoretical framework is used. The two different schools used in 
the framework will be described broadly. A more NATO specific analysis will be presented 
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in later chapters. At the end of the Introduction Chapter, a complete chapter outline is 
offered. 
In order to be able to make a fruitful analysis and to make everything more orderly in 
a thesis, it is necessary to have a theoretical framework. Theories are different 
understandings of connections and relations between different phenomena, which you have 
developed as an academic, and which you want to test in the real world. All theories are 
similar in that they are abstractions of real phenomena. 14 In this thesis the two different 
perspectives, or schools, mentioned above, will be used. Neorealism and neoliberal 
institutionalism constitute two dominant schools in International Relations, and they provide 
a base for studying contemporary NATO. It is very important to stress that there are many 
factions within each school, each with a different slant of how things work. Instead of 
describing and using them all, the main stream ideas in both schools will be used. Here 
follows an introduction to the two schools. They will later be used in Chapters Two, Three 
and Four when the thesis addresses the two stages of NATO's response to the legitimacy 
challenge. 
The neorealist school begins with the assumption that states must take care of their 
own security since no central authority exists which can look after the security needs of the 
world. Anarchy is the ordering condition of the international system.15 Conflict rather than 
cooperation is seen as the norm, and what is more important in this thesis, "bipolar balances 
of power are stable and conducive to peace, while multipolar balances are unstable and 
14 Idar Magne Holme; Bernt Solvang, Forskningsmetodik (Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1991), p. 51. 
15 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory oflnternational Politics (New York: Random House, 1979), pp. 102-111. 
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conducive to war". 16 Neorealists recognize, however, that states might cooperate through 
institutions if there are good reasons to do so. The existence of a state of anarchy is such a 
reason, and states may well decide to form alliances if they can find a common ground. It 
should be noted though that "alliances reflect state calculations of self-interest based 
primarily on the international distribution of power". 17 According to the neorealist school, 
defence alliances are only one of several ways of achieving security against adversaries. 
Without an adversary, or common enemy, states which have entered an alliance will lack the 
necessary incentive to continue the cooperation. As soon as the glue, that kept the partners 
together, begins to wear off, the defence alliance will begin to disintegrate. That is why 
many neorealists are pessimistic about the future of NATO. Kenneth Waltz, one of the 
greatest proponents of this school, stated late in 1993 that "NATO's days are not numbered, 
but its years are". 18 This can be interpreted to mean that unless new threats arise in the North 
Atlantic area, NATO will be in trouble. 
The neoliberal school has a different view of state actions and defence alliances. 
According to those who belong to this school, states calculate their interests not only by 
looking at the international distribution of capabilities. They also take into account the 
positive effects of international institutions. There is a conviction that institutions matter, 
and that institutions "enable the international system to 'transcend' the otherwise bleak 
16 David G. Haglund, "NATO Expansion: Origins and Evolutions of an Idea" in (ed.) David G. Haglund, 
Will NATO Go East? (Kingston, Ont: Queens University, 1996), p. 19. 
17 Alfred van Staden, "A Lasting Alliance? On the Creation, Evolution, and Future of NATO", Acta Politica 
vol. 30, no. 3 (July, 1995), p. 299. 
18 Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics", International Security 18 (Fall 
1993), p. 75. 
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dictates of the doctrine of 'self-help'". 19 Defence alliances are not only a sign of temporary 
common interests among states, but they are also seen as agents shaping those interests, and 
as Alfred van Staden says, indirectly the institutions will shape the practices of states.20 
Institutional characteristics such as an organization's strength and degree of integration will 
have a major impact on the evolution of such alliances. 
Both schools of thought agree that alliances and institutions are likely to fade away 
when their main purpose no longer exists. The difference between them is the view held by 
neoliberal institutionalists that there are greater incentives to keep and maintain an 
alliance/institution even after a case when the purpose is gone. This should be compared to 
neorealists who argue that it is only a matter of time before an alliance without purpose 
dissolves. Neoliberal proponents argue that there is a lot to gain from cooperation which 
should be a goal in itself. 
NATO's continued existence is explained by neorealists as something natural. They 
do not believe that the purpose of NATO is gone. On the contrary, a military alliance is very 
much needed in an unstable, multipolar world. NATO is needed as a balancing tool since 
new and old threats still are perceived.21 The threat from the Soviet Union does not exist any 
longer, but Russia, albeit temporarily paralyzed, may rise again and enter its role as West's 
natural enemy. With its military resources, its possession of weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD), and the risk of both internal and external conflicts in the hemisphere, Russia's 
security stance will profoundly affect security in the northern region.22 Neorealists are 
19 Haglund, 1996, p. 21. 
20 van Staden, 1995, p. 299. 
21 Haglund, 1996, p. 22. 
22 Kaiser, 1996, p. 136. 
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convinced that it is only a matter of time before something happens that will threaten 
Western Security.23 
Other reasons are used by neoliberal institutionalists to explain NATO's persistence. 
Firstly, by maintaining an organization with well-established structures, decision-making 
processes and means of effective communication, NATO can meet its traditional goal of 
providing security for its members. Yet at the same time, NATO can transform itself from an 
exclusively military alliance to a more inclusive organization, where the goal is to extend 
security and stability to areas beyond the North Atlantic area. The creation of the North 
Atlantic Cooperation Council and the Partnership for Peace programme are evidence of this 
extended role of NATO. The next step is enlarging the Alliance. Secondly, neoliberal 
institutionalists explain NATO's survival by pointing to the fact that the integrated military 
structure of the Alliance seems to have been successful in deterring and defending against 
the Warsaw Pact. 24 Thirdly, it is argued that the integrated military structure of NATO also 
functioned as an "international regime which contributed considerably to the 
denationalization of Western defence policies and the integration of Germany" into Europe's 
security community. 25 Strengthening the military alliance might be a good justification for 
NATO's continued existence, especially since the increased importance of Germany after the 
unification in October 1990. As stated before, there is fear in some countries that Germany 
could turn to aggressive and expansionist policies. The more integrated Germany is to the 
West, the safer these countries will feel. 26 
23 van Staden, 1995, p. 300. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid., p. 301. 
26 Kramer and Smoke, 1996. 
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It is argued in this thesis that it is absolutely necessary to use both schools in order to 
fully understand what happened to NATO. It is not enough to use the ideas of one of the 
schools without taking the ideas of the other into consideration. Each school provides a 
different way of looking at things and together they complement each other. They both have 
advantages and disadvantages which make them weak alone.Z7 Only by putting the events 
into perspective, using both schools, can we gain a better understanding of what happened to 
NATO after the legitimacy challenge that was posed toward the Alliance due to the events 
that took place in Eastern and Central Europe. 
III. The Response - Two Stages 
The first stage in NATO's response to the legitimacy challenge is the political and 
academic debate, which began after it was clear that the communist regimes had fallen. In 
the debate there were many people who voiced justifications for maintaining NATO as the 
defence organization in Europe. These justifications were adopted not long after the first 
questions arose regarding NATO's legitimacy. The second stage deals with the actual 
changes that took place within NATO. It is argued in this thesis that the changes that took 
place within NATO came as a response to the political and academic debate that followed 
the initial challenge to NATO's legitimacy. This debate resulted in different justifications 
offered by politicians and academics. 
With respect to the first stage of the response, the justifications offered for NATO's 
survival are divided into two groups, external and internal. This is done to make it easier to 
27 The advantages and the disadvantages will be outlined in Chapter Five. (The author) 
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comprehend the different arguments used to support NATO's continued existence. The first 
group, which looks at external justifications, examines arguments that propose that events 
happening outside the geographical and political sphere of NATO make it necessary or 
useful to maintain the Atlantic Alliance. These external justifications can be classified as 
either positive or negative. 
The positive reasons are based on the hope that NATO can work as a tool in bringing 
the East closer to the West, and by doing so make the former communist countries more 
politically, socially and economically stable. This group of justifications are closely related 
to the neoliberal school where the positive characteristics, such as cooperation, is stressed. 
The common belief is that Europe and the world will become safer if the West helps these 
countries to become truly democratic states. Addressing students at Georgetown University 
in February 1996, NATO Secretary General, Javier Solana, stated: "The challenge for your 
generation and mine is to consolidate democracy by extending NATO's security community 
to the other half of Europe".28 NATO has stressed more and more its political role, and 
changed its military posture.29 The former U.S. Secretary of State, James Baker, stated that 
NATO's new mission was to act as the forum where "Western nations cooperate to 
negotiate, implement, verify and extend agreements between East and West".30 This would 
create a new security structure where the importance of military matters is reduced, and the 
importance of political matters is increased. The results of the positive justifications will be 
presented in Chapter Three, but one example of the changed political focus is the decision to 
28 Javier Solana, "Renewing the Transatlantic Partnership: NATO Confronts the Next Century" , 
Georgetown University, Washington D.C., February 20, 1996. 
29 Carr and Ifantis, 1996, p.62. 
30 Phil Williams, "CFE and the Future of NATO" in (ed.) J. Philip Rogers, The Future of European Security 
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make NATO resources available to support peace-keeping operations initiated by the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)31 and the United Nations in the 
former Yugoslavia.32 President Clinton's Partnership for Peace programme (PFP) is another 
example. The idea behind PFP is to expand and intensify political and military cooperation 
throughout Europe. 33 
In addition to the positive justifications, there were also negative justifications based 
on a more explicit threat if you compare with the more implicit threat of the positive 
justifications. The negative justifications are stressed by the proponents of the neorealist 
school caused by its view of world affairs. They tend to be more pessimistic in their outlook. 
Many of the explicit threats which were perceived when NATO was created are now gone. 
New threats have replaced some of the old threats, and together they are said to give some 
legitimacy to NATO's persistence. Three new fears have come to the forefront in arguments 
justifying NATO's continued existence. First, there is the military threat. The states that 
replaced the Soviet Union continue to possess a vast military capability and, as seen in 
Chechnya, there is still a tendency to use military power to solve conflicts. Russia has not 
been able to convince the West completely that the country will not return to a 
confrontational and/or expansionist posture.34 Another negative, external, reason is the risk 
of nuclear proliferation that has spread after the disintegration of the former Soviet Union. It 
has turned out to be very difficult to keep track of the nuclear warheads that were located in 
(New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1993), p. 138. 
31 CSCE is now called the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). 
32 JohnS . Duffield, "NATO's Functions after the Cold War" , Political Science Quarterly vol. 109, no. 5 
(Winter 1994-1995), p. 768. 
33 U.S. Department of Defense, United States Security Strategy for Europe and NATO (Washington, D.C.: 
Department of Defense, Office oflnternational Security Affairs, June 1995), p. 10. 
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Russia, the Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus. There is also the problem of underpaid nuclear 
scientists in these republics. The fear of know-how proliferation is real.35 
Now that we have reviewed the external justifications, we must also consider the internal 
ones. By keeping NATO, well-established routines of cooperation and channels of 
communication between the members can continue to serve the goal of stability and security. 
This goal is also perceived to be easier to reach if the United States is involved in Europe's 
security affairs, which it does through NATO. Another internal justification that has been 
used is that of cost efficiency. Defence expenditures have become an increasingly heavy 
burden for single states. Through the cooperation of developing weapons systems and 
conducting joint military maneuvers, it is believed that the costs can be kept at a lower level 
than what otherwise would have been possible for the members of NATO. As can be seen, 
the internal justifications are also related to neoliberal institutionalism in that they stress the 
positive things about keeping the organization. 
We now turn to the second step of the response to NATO's legitimacy challenge: the 
actual changes. NATO is a special organization, created for specific reasons, in a very 
unique period. The 1990s have been a period of transition for the defence organization. We 
have seen, in recognition of the new landscape in Europe, an evolution of NATO that 
encompasses both its ways of working and its ways of thinking. The process of change, 
which is still underway, has been rapid despite the cemented structures caused by years of 
thinking and acting along long-established lines or patterns. At the same time, there has been 
a strong political desire from the Eastern and Central European countries to see NATO 
34 Duffield, 1994-1995 , p. 770. 
35 Taylor, 1994, pp. 16-28. 
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change from its Cold War character into an organization where security can be extended 
eastwards. 
The theoretical framework used in stage one is applicable in stage two as well. It 
seems as if explanations for the changes that took place within NATO follow the same lines 
as the justifications used by the two schools in the first stage. Neorealists like to explain 
NATO's new military structure with arguments connected to their theory that Russia, for 
example, still poses a threat to the West. NATO's enhanced political role is explained by 
neoliberal institutionalists arguing that that is the best way to extend security in Europe, and 
that NATO has the means and the experience to reach that goal. 
IV. Definition of Concepts 
Before turning to a chapter review, there are two concepts which need to be treated a 
bit more in depth: change and security. Since the concept of change has a very important 
role in the thesis, it is necessary to define what it means. It has been said that the only 
constant in human affairs is change. No political system can avoid dealing with change. 
Fernand Braudel, a French historian argued that there are three levels of change: the change 
which politicians and statesmen make; the slower movement in social and technological 
change; and the long evolution of basic ways of life and culture.36 It seems as if the political 
changes taking place in East and Central Europe were caused by a mixture of the three levels 
above. Change is a word that can be interpreted in many different ways and academics 
frequently do so. The general interpretation in this thesis is based upon the interpretation of 
36 Rais A. Khan , James D. McNiven, An Introduction to Political Science (Scarborough, Ont.:Nelson 
Canada, 1991), p. 330. 
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The New Collins Dictionary and Thesaurus.37 The concept is used in this sense: change is a 
process wherein someone or something alters its physical or metaphysical appearance or 
content, by itself, or by virtue of the influence of external factors. It is a process that can be 
explained by looking at causes and effects. The process of change can last during a longer or 
shorter period of time, and in some cases the process never ends. Change, more specifically 
in political terms, is the result of changes in support and demand on a system. This 
phenomenon is called inputs. These inputs will transform in political processes into outputs, 
which hopefully will satisfy the demands. "The matching of outputs to initial input occurs 
through feedback, which provides a real or perceptual measure of the system's response to 
interests and demands."38 In connection with the discussion about change, it should be noted 
that the changes regarding NATO covered in Chapter Two differed from the changes 
described in Chapter Four. In the first case, there was no legitimacy challenge to talk about 
and the changes were part of the evolution of the Alliance. In the second case, the changes 
came as a response to external events that created a legitimacy challenge wherein NATO 
tried to prevent its demise. 
The concept of security will be used in the traditional way in the sense that the state 
and state sovereignty are the targets which are threatened by terrorism, migration, 
revolutions, wars and other external and internal factors .39 This is not to say that it is only 
military matters that can threaten a state or a group of states. Security is a multidimensional 
concept. The new threats, such as environmental, social and economic threats, which to 
37 William T. McLeod, The New Collins Dictionary and Thesaurus (London: William Collins and Co Ltd, 
1987), p. 160. 
38 Khan and McNiven, 1991 , p. 331. 
39This definition is explained in for example Johan Galtung, Environment. Development and Military 
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some extent have pushed aside military ones, are accepted as having the capability of 
causing insecurity and instability.40 The important thing to remember in this thesis is that it 
is the state which is considered to be the target of threats and which is the ultimate institution 
providing security guarantees for its population.41 Threat is used in this thesis as something 
that endangers the security and stability of the state and the state sovereignty. 
V. Outline of the Thesis 
We now turn to a review of the chapters. After the Introduction Chapter, which 
consisted of introduction, the aim of the thesis, definitions and this outline, Chapter One 
offers a background with the establishment of NATO. It briefly describes the reasons for 
NATO's creation and the evolution of the defence organization. NATO's response to the 
events in Eastern and Central Europe in the 1990s (which is studied in chapters two, three, 
and four), therefore, can be placed within a frame of reference. The main points of the 
Chapter One stress the perceived threat posed by the Soviet Union and its satellites during 
the Cold War, and thus explain why NATO evolved as it did. It also stresses the effect of the 
Cold War and the implications of this ideological struggle on NATO, implications that 
solidified security structures for four decades. They became so solidified that the security 
organization was caught by surprise when the Communist bloc began to disintegrate. 
Chapter Two studies NATO's initial response wherein it offers justifications used by 
politicians and academics to maintain the organization. The first stage of NATO's response 
Activity (Oslo: Universitetsfi:irlaget, 1992), pp. 75-82. 
40To read more about different kind of threats please see B ji:irn Hettne, Internationella Relationer (Lund: 
Studentlitteratur, 1992). 
41 States can enter alliances like NATO, but it is in the end always the single state that is responsible for 
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was the debate where mainly politicians and academics have attempted to meet the 
legitimacy challenge posed against NATO by coming up with justifications for NATO's 
continued existence. As stated before, these justifications have been divided into external 
and internal ones. 
Chapters Three and Four examine the actual changes that have taken place with the 
purpose of explaining how and why NATO responded/adapted the way it did. Chapter Three 
concentrates on and describes the changes that took place within NATO after the first 
communist governments in East Europe began to fall, and looks at the Alliance from this 
point until the present day. The process of change in the Alliance commenced in 1990.42 
Since then, one can basically see two different sorts of changes. First, new ways of thinking 
have changed the ideological doctrines which determine the policies and the goals for the 
organization. The members of NATO have "updated their common strategic concept, 
maintained NATO's integrated military structure, and continue to engage in joint military 
planning, training and exercises".43 New policies and fora have been established with the 
purpose of creating dialogue and cooperation regarding security between the former 
communist countries and the West. The Alliance has also taken on the task of becoming the 
peace-keeping tool of the United Nations in the former Yugoslavia, where one of the tasks is 
to enforce the resolutions introduced by the UN.44 Second, there are the new organizational 
structures in NATO's military and non-military bodies, of which the Combined Joint Task 
Forces (CJTFs) and PFP are examples. 
providing security for its population. (The author) 
42 Carr and Ifantis, 1996, p. 62. 
43 Duffield, 1994-1995, p. 765 . 
44 Ibid. 
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Chapter Four tries to compare and explain the changes that have taken place within 
NATO. Were the actual changes responses to the justifications used by politicians and 
academics during the period of the legitimacy challenge, and why did NATO tum out the 
way it did? The changes have been divided into two parts, just like in Chapter Three, where 
the first part explains the new way of thinking within NATO, and the second part explains 
the military changes that have taken place. 
The final chapter contains the conclusions that can be drawn from the analysis. It also 
includes a discussion about NATO's future, and the importance of the defence alliance. The 
author argues that NATO will remain in Europe as an important actor in the security arena, 
and that the organization is needed both in the West and in the East. Its imminent expansion 
eastwards will enhance NATO's strength and possibility to survive on a longer term 
considerably. However, the enhanced importance of Europe might influence the relationship 
between the European half of NATO and the North American counterpart. 
VI. Conclusion 
As a summary of the chapter it can be said that this thesis uses a theoretical 
framework which is based upon two schools: the neorealist and the neoliberal institutionalist 
schools. These will be used when studying NATO's response to the legitimacy challenge, 
which was caused by the political events in East and Central Europe at the end of the 1980s 
and in the beginning of the 1990s. They will also be used when studying how the Alliance 
has adapted to the new security environment. The neorealist school mainly stresses the 
external justifications based JJpon threats described above as the reasons for NATO's 
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survival. The neoliberal school uses the justifications which stress the positive inherent 
qualifications of NATO and the possibilities to extend security eastwards offered in Europe. 
The specific question asked in the thesis is: what was NATO's response to the legitimacy 
challenge? This response has been divided into two stages. The first stage deals with the 
political and academic debate. Since NATO's survival is a fact, only the justifications that 
argue that NATO should be maintained are studied. There are, broadly speaking, two sorts of 
justifications: external and internal ones. External justifications are based upon different 
threat perceptions while internal justifications concentrate more on NATO as an 
organization and the positive aspects of a maintained Alliance. The conclusion from 
outlining all the different reasons for keeping NATO is that the Alliance is needed in 
Europe. The second stage includes the changes which followed the initial debate in the first 
stage. There were both changes in thinking and in how NATO is structured. This process is 
still under way. Next chapter is a background chapter which has been included to introduce 
the reader to NATO and to provide him/her with a better understanding of the topics covered 
later in the thesis. 
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Chapter 1 
Background to NATO: Its Creation and Evolution 
I. Introduction 
This chapter provides a brief background description of NATO and of its 
evolution. This background is essential to understand how NATO evolved and why it 
evolved the way it did. An in-depth description of NATO, all its bodies and functions is 
not feasible because the size of the thesis. Only important bodies, functions, events and 
major changes will be highlighted. This will be done in five sections. The first deals with 
the origins of NATO and the reasons for its formation. The second describes the 
evolution of the civilian and military structures of the organization as they existed in the 
early years. The third looks at the changes NATO has gone through over the years until 
the end of the 1980s. The fourth describes the events that laid the foundation for the 
major changes we see today. The final section concludes the chapter with a small 
summary. 
II. Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
After World War II, Europe was more or less in ruins. All of the wartime allies, 
except for the Soviet Union, began to withdraw the majority of their troops from the war-
torn countries 1 and a slow process of rebuilding Europe commenced. 2 Even though the 
second major war of the century had just ended, many people were concerned that 
1 It should be noted that large concentrations of troops were kept in Germany as occupation forces. 
2 Lord Ismay, NATO- The First Five Years 1949-1954 (Paris: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 
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Germany would once again have the capability to become a threat in Europe. This 
sentiment was especially common in France, which had experienced three German 
invasions in seventy years3. As a result of this fear, the Dunkirk Treaty was signed by 
Great Britain and France in March, 1947. As William Park says in his book Defending 
the West: "This treaty of alliance and mutual assistance was aimed specifically at the 
possibility of a renewed German menace".4 On January 22, 1948, it was proposed by 
Britain's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ernest Bevin, that the collaboration between France 
and Britain should be extended to Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Less than 
two months later on March 4, 1948, the Brussels Treaty was signed by the countries 
mentioned above.5 However, it was not Germany that turned out to be the main problem 
for the Western countries. The cooperation between the Western armies and the Soviet 
Red Army was not without strains, and after the end of the war the cooperation ended. 
Winston Churchill sent a telegram to President Truman, May 12, 1945, which illustrates 
some of the anxiety that began to grow regarding a possible Soviet threat: 
I am profoundly concerned about the European situation. I learn that half the American Air Force 
in Europe has already begun to move to the Pacific theatre. The newspapers are full of the great 
movements of American armies out of Europe. Our armies also are, under previous arrangements, 
likely to undergo a marked reduction .. .In a short space of time our armed power on the Continent 
will have vanished, except for moderate forces to hold down Germany. Meanwhile what is to 
happen about Russia? .. .I feel deep anxiety because of their misinterpretation of the Yalta 
decisions, their attitude towards Poland, their overwhelming influence in the Balkans, excepting 
Greece, the difficulties they make about Vienna, the combination of Russian power and the 
territories under their control or occupied, coupled with the Communist technique in so many other 
countries, and above all their power to maintain very large armies in the field. What will be the 
position in a year or two when ... Russia may choose to keep 200-300 divisions on active service? 
An iron curtain is drawn down upon their front. We do not know what is going on behind.6 
November 1954), pp. 3-4. 
3Martina Roos (ed.) NATO. Vasteuropeiska Unionen (Stockholm: Utrikespolitiska Institutet, August 1994), 
pp. 4-5 . 
4 William Park, Defending the West (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1986), p. 11. 
5 Lord Ismay, 1954, pp. 7-8 . 
6 Ibid., pp. 3-4. 
22 
Instead of reducing the number of its troops and weapons, the USSR continued to 
increase the size and number of its armies. Private estimates from Western sources 
suggested that approximately 25-30 per cent of the total Soviet state budget was spent on 
defence and defence-related research and development in the post-war period until at least 
1969.7 
The international settlements which were reached towards the end of the war, one 
of which drew up the political map for example, were not honoured, and democratic 
regimes in the East European countries were not allowed by the Soviets to follow their 
own paths. 8 Poland became a sore spot in the relations between the United States and the 
Soviet Union. When the Soviet leadership backed a communist-led government in 
Warsaw in 1946, Truman interpreted that as a clear proof that Stalin intended to dominate 
all of Eastern Europe.9 
These Soviet actions in the early post-war period were increasingly perceived as a 
threat by the West. 182,400 square miles were annexed by the Soviet Union between 
1940 and 1945, a political decision that affected almost 25 million people who lived in 
these areas which had once been part of Finland, Poland, Romania, Germany, and 
Czechoslovakia. 10 The three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were also 
annexed after a short period of independence between the two world wars. In areas which 
7 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO- Facts and Figures (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 
1969), p. 77. 
8 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Handbook (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 
1995), p. 20. 
9 Robert D. Schulzinger, American Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1994), pp. 205-206.; See also William Taubman, Stalin's American Policy: From Entente to Detente 
to Cold War (New York, 1992). See also Vojtech Mastny, Russia's Road to the Cold War (New York, 
1979). 
10 NATO Information Service, 1969, pp. 15-16. 
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the Soviet Union could not annex, the Soviets stationed their armies and organized 
Communist infiltrations into popular front governments in an attempt dominate and 
control these countries. This added about 390,000 square miles to the sphere of Soviet 
influence in Poland, Eastern Germany, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Albania and 
Romania. 11 The Belgian Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Paul-Henri 
Spaak, stated at the UN General Assembly in 1948: "There is but one Great Power that 
emerged from the war having conquered other territories, and that power is the USSR" .12 
Yet, it was not only in Eastern Europe where the Russians tried to exert their 
influence. Soviet troops tried, in vain, to get a foothold in Northern Iran after the war as 
they had territorial claims on Kars, Ardahan, and military bases in the Turkish Straits. 
The USSR also supported guerrilla movements in Greece, Indochina, the Philippines and 
Malaya. In 1945, the Soviet Union extended its influence in Asia by occupying the greater 
part of Manchuria and the northern parts of Korea. Finally, the Soviet Union supported 
unrest and strikes led by communist parties in Burma. 13 
Slowly, the sense of insecurity and uncertainty that some European statesmen 
(among which Winston Churchill was the most outspoken) had had for some time, began 
to spread in the West. Soviet policies were seen as extremely expansionist. The period 
1947-48 saw great changes not only in the relations between the European countries and 
the Soviet Union, but also between the USA and the USSR. While the Western 
Europeans felt directly threatened by the Soviets because of their proximity, the 
Americans were more concerned about the long-term threats that the USSR might pose to 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid., p. 15. 
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the American economic and political leadership in the world. 14 
The idea of a security organization started to form after it became clear that the 
United Nations would not be able to eliminate this sense of insecurity. The Soviet Union 
was a permanent member on the Security Council and threatened to stop any serious 
attempts by the West to stop the Soviet plans. 15 Great Britain's Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Ernest Bevin, told U.S. Secretary of State, George Marshall: 
I am convinced that the Soviet Union will not deal with the West on any reasonable terms in the 
foreseeable future and that the salvation of the West depends upon the formation of some form of 
union, formal or informal in character, in Western Europe, backed by the United States and the 
Dominions, such a mobilisation of moral and material force as will inspire confidence and energy 
within, and respect elsewhere. 16 
This conversation became the first seed of what would later become NATO. Before that 
happened, the Brussels Treaty, which consisted of mutual defence obligations between 
Great Britain, France, and the Benelux countries, was signed in March, 1948. The United 
States approved of the slowly evolving cooperation taking place between the West 
European countries.17 This Brussels Treaty was signed only a month after the communist 
take-over of Czechoslovakia, which was part of the Soviet Union's campaign to secure 
influence in Eastern Europe. Even though the Brussels Treaty was not the result of a 
"hostile" event, it did increase the determination ofthe member states to cooperate in a 
manner that would prevent, or decrease, ideological, political and military threats to the 
13 Ibid., p. 18. 
14 Wichard Woyke," Foundation and History of NATO, 1948-1950", in (eds.) Norbert Wiggershaus and 
Roland G. Forester, The Western Security Community, 1948-1950, (Providence, USA: Berg Publishers, 
1993), p. 251. 
15 Sir Winston Churchill and Canada's Louis St. Laurent had in 1946 discussed a defense alliance within the 
United Nations. (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, (Brussels: 
NATO Information Service, 1989) 
16 Theodor Achilles, NATO Review (1979), p. 11. (vol. and no. unknown) 
17 Henrik Gustafsson, NATOs Utvidgning Polen och Lettland - Mellan Ryssland & Vasteuropa, minor 
thesis, Vaxjo University, 1996 (Vaxjo: Vaxjo University, 1996), p. 13. 
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states involved. 18 Paul-Henri Spaak told the Soviet delegate Vyshinsky during a session 
in the UN Assembly in 1948: 
Do you know the basis of our policy? It is fear, fear of you, your policy, your government... 
The truth is that your foreign policy today is more audacious and more ambitious than that 
of the Tsars themselves. 19 
Even if the Americans approved of the cooperation, they were not prepared to take 
part themselves. All contemporary sources agree that the United States was not expecting 
a military attack on Europe by the Soviet Union. In the past, Washington's policy had 
been that the Europeans had to take the responsibility for themselves?0 The idea of 
containing the spreading of communism soon won ground. George Kennan, an American 
diplomat in Moscow, wrote the famous, long telegram in which he tried to explain why 
the Soviets behaved the way they did. The main argument was that historic and cultural 
aspects in Russia/the Soviet Union made it natural for the Soviets to expand?1 An event 
that helped that cause was the Berlin Blockade ordered by Stalin in June, 1948. The 
blockade lasted for 323 days, during which the Allies transported food and supplies to the 
city. The opinion of the Americans changed. Ernest Bevin's successor, Clement Attlee, 
expressed this the following way: "It wasn't, I think, until the Berlin airlift that American 
public opinion really wakened up to the facts of life. Their own troops were involved in 
that you see."22 
It was against this background that discussions and negotiations began regarding 
18 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1995, p. 20. 
19 Wiggershaus and Forester, 1993, p. 251. 
20 Klaus Schwabe, "The Origins of the United States' Engagement in Europe, 1946-1952", in (eds.) Francis 
H. Heller and John R. Gillingham, NATO: The Founding of the Atlantic Alliance and the Integration of 
Europe, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), p. 169. 
21 Schulzinger, 1994. 
22 Park, 1986, p. 6. 
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the security of the North Atlantic area. 23 It was clear to Western leaders that the Soviet 
Union did not have friendly intentions towards them. First, the Soviets did not follow the 
agreement on a buffer zone between the West and the Soviet Union that would contain 
friendly nations. Secondly, the military build-up continued as if the war were still going 
on. Thirdly, the Soviets tried to achieve influence in countries that were considered a part 
of the Western "hemisphere" including Finland and Norway. Finally, the blockade of 
Berlin sent a message to the West that was anything but friendly. 
The five countries which had signed the Brussels Treaty met on a regular basis. In 
July, 1948 the Americans and the Canadians joined these meetings as observers. In 
September of the same year, the Western Union Defence Organization (WUDO) was 
formed as a military agency under the Brussels Treaty. Field Marshal Bernard Law 
Montgomery was appointed permanent Chairman of the Land, Naval and Air 
Commanders-in-Committee, which was located in Fontainebleau, France. When the 
structure of NATO was being considered, the politicians looked at WUD0.24 For 
instance, NATO adopted, among other things, the cost sharing principle used for 
infrastructure. This principle determined that no country should have to bear a heavier 
burden than the rest.25 
Talks were held on the subject of extending the Brussels Treaty to include the 
North Atlantic area. It was the British and Canadians who initiated these discussions. 
Since the threat coming from the East was more than a military threat, the negotiators 
decided that if there were to be a North Atlantic Treaty it would have to include more 
23 Please see Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty in Appendix I. 
24 Lord Ismay, 1954, p. 9. 
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than just a military organisation. Escott Reid stated in his essay, "Forming the North 
Atlantic Alliance, 1949", that: "The treaty should rally not only the military and economic 
resources of Western Europe but also its spiritual resources in a dynamic, liberal and 
democratic counter-offensive against Russian totalitarianism."26 
It has been argued that the discussions leading to the signing of the Alliance went 
through three different phases.27 During the first phase only the United States, Canada, 
and Great Britain took part, and the discussions were held in secret. On the 6th of July, 
1948, the second phase commenced. The talks related to this second phase were held in 
Washington between the State Department, the ambassadors of Canada and the Brussels 
Treaty countries?8 The result of these talks was a report which made a number of 
recommendations. These recommendations stated that a North Atlantic treaty should: 
1) promote peace and security; 
2) express determination of the Parties to resist aggression; 
3) define the area in which it would operate; 
4) be based on a principle of self-help and mutual aid; 
5) be military, but also promote stability and well-being for the peoples in 
question; 
6) provide machinery for implementation29 
The countries had decided from the beginning that any treaty would have to be 
within the United Nations' Charter. In December 1948, the countries reached an 
25 Ibid., p. 114. 
26 Escott Reid, "Forming the North Atlantic Alliance, 1949", in (eds.) Don Munton and John Kirton, 
Canadian Foreign Policy, (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall Canada, Inc., 1992), p. 33. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Lord Ismay, 1954, p. 10. 
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agreement on the basic principles. The major difficulty was the United States' initial 
reluctance to enter into any "automatic commitments".30 The European countries, on the 
other hand, wanted a binding agreement. The next step was to come up with a draft of the 
North Atlantic Treaty, a work in which all seven countries were involved. The 
negotiations were long and difficult. Theodore C. Achilles, one of the US negotiators, 
said: 
The basic differences were due to the facts that the Europeans, particularly the French, 
wanted as binding and as long a commitment as possible, and the Americans, while agreeing 
in principle, were constrained by what the Administration and friendly senators thought the Senate 
would accept.31 
In the third phase, other countries which were part of the North Atlantic area were 
approached. Italy, Portugal, the Republic of Ireland, Sweden, Norway, Iceland, and 
Denmark were all asked if they wanted to cooperate. All of the countries, except Sweden 
and the Republic of Ireland, decided to join the group of seven. On March 15th, 1949, 
these countries were formally invited, and three days later the Treaty was made public. 
On April 4th, twelve countries signed the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington?2 These 
countries were: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The Treaty 
was ratified by the countries within five months of it being signed.33 
To summarize the Treaty, one could say that the signatories considered an attack 
against any member state as an attack against them all. Article 5 is the crucial article in 
29 Ibid. 
30 Nicholas Rengger (ed.) , Treaties and Alliances of the World (Harlow, Essex, UK: Longman Group UK 
Limited, 1990), p. 177. 
31 Park, 1986, p. 10. 
32 Please see appendix I for the contents of the North Atlantic Treaty. 
33 Park, 1986, pp. 10-11. 
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the Treaty. The Parties promised to use any means , including the use of armed forces , 
which were seen as necessary to re-establish, and to maintain security in the North 
Atlantic area. Conflicts should, first of all , be solved with peaceful means according to 
the UN Charter. However, Article 51 stated that self-defence was allowed. Apart from the 
military aspects, the Treaty also included paragraphs on how to improve economic 
relations, and how to build up democratic institutions in order to work toward a peaceful 
world.34 Especially Article Two stresses NATO as a tool for developing friendly relations 
between the members, and for eliminating conflicts within the Alliance. It was very much 
thanks to the Canadians that Article Two was included in the Treaty. This Article has 
gained new importance after the fall of the communist regimes. 
It was a large step for the Americans to take when they signed the North Atlantic 
Treaty. By doing so, they had given the Western European countries a guarantee against 
aggression, a guarantee that had to be supported by military force.35 This sort of 
engagement in European affairs was unprecedented. It was very different from the 
isolationist tradition of international policies that had almost been a "rule" in the United 
States.36 
III. Building a Structure for the New Defence Organization37 
The evolution of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization occurred in different 
phases distinguished by periods of reform. The first phase, which commenced 
34 Roos, 1994, p. 4. 
35 Erik Holm, NATO och Warszawapakten (Stockholm: Utrikespolitiska Institutet, 1983), p. 3. 
36 Heller and Gillingham, 1992, p. 161. 
37 Please see appendix II for the early structures of NATO. 
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immediately after the Treaty was signed, and the phase saw the re-building of the armed 
forces of the European members.38 Except for the defence machinery of the United 
Kingdom, the armed forces of the rest of the members were small or non-existent. 39 The 
United States created a programme of military assistance. In 1950, $1,450,000,00040 were 
set aside for NATO. Of that amount, one billion dollars went to the European countries.41 
In Article 9 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the Parties agreed that they must develop 
policies to enable them to fu lfil the obligations stated in the Treaty. A body called the 
Working Group was established to produce recommendations for suitable institutions and 
methods. The report that was produced by the Working Group was presented at the first 
meeting of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) in Washington on the 17th September, 
1949. What follows is a summary of the most important decisions during that meeting. 
First, the members of the Council were to be the Foreign Ministers of the countries. 
Secondly, it was decided that English and French were to be the two official languages of 
the organization. Thirdly, the Defence Ministers of the member countries would be part 
of a Defence Committee, which would be set up with the task of drawing up defence 
plans for the North Atlantic area. Fourthly, the Defence Committee would establish a 
Military Committee, which would be part of the military organization with military 
representatives from each country. It would provide policy guidance regarding military 
matters to the Standing Group, which was its executive body. Only representatives from 
38 The use of these phases is taken from Lord Ismay, NATO- The First Five Years 1949-1954 (Paris: 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1954) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO- Facts and 
Figures (Brussels: NATO Information Services, 1969). 
39 Tomas Erazim, NATO- en organisation i foriindring, minor thesis, Viixjo University, 1994 (Viixjo: 
Viixjo University, 1994), p. 8. 
40 The value of the amount stated above is the value it had in 1950. 
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the United Kingdom, France, and the United States were to be members of the Standing 
Group. Fifth and finally, five Regional Planning Groups were to be established: the 
Northern European Group, the Western European Group, the Southern European-Western 
Mediterranean Group, the Canadian-United States Group, and the North Atlantic Ocean 
Group. These Planning Groups had the task to develop and recommend plans for the 
defence of their regions to the Military Committee through the Standing Group.42 
At the second meeting in Washington on the 18th of November, 1949, it was 
decided to establish two other agencies. The first one was the Defence, Financial and 
Economic Committee which would consist of the Finance Ministers, and had, among 
other things, the task of developing, in cooperation with the other agencies, overall 
financial and economic guides for the future defence programmes of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization. It also gathered information on defence expenditures and on 
resources in an attempt to develop methods for measuring costs and for transferring 
military equipment and surplus stocks between the member countries.43 The members of 
the committee also had to come up with a plan for mobilizing financial and economic 
resources in time of an emergency.44 
The second agency set up at the second Council meeting was the Military 
Production and Supply Board. It would work under the Defence Committee and find 
ways of corning up with supplies when they fell short of military requirements. A second 
41 Lord Ismay, 1954, p. 23. 
42 Ibid. , pp. 24-25 . 
43 RobertS. Jordan and Michael W. Bloome, Political Leadership in NATO: A Study in Multinational 
Diplomacy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979), p. 8. 
44 Lord Ismay, 1954-1955., pp. 25-27. 
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task was to plan for more effective ways of producing military equipment.45 During the 
Defence Committee's first meeting in December 1949, a strategic concept was introduced 
for the integrated defence of the North Atlantic area. A programme would also be 
established to coordinate production and deliveries of weapons and equipment. This 
concept was based upon the principles of self-help and mutual aid. This was important 
since the Treaty does not require the signatories to rush to the aid of an attacked 
member.46 
The organization now had a number of bodies and a structure. This structure was 
enough to get the organization started and it would change over the years, but at the time 
it was sufficient for implementing the most important decisions. The new bodies worked 
continuously collecting information and drawing up plans. One of the most important 
consequences of this was the experience of both civilian and military personnel working 
together in different committees and groups.47 By this cooperation, channels of 
communications were developed which strengthened NATO and helped in times of 
crises. 
The first major changes to the structure of the organization occurred in May, 
1951, after it had become clear that the original structure was unsatisfactory. The changes 
were designed to enhance the efficiency of the organization. Most new organizations have 
problems at the beginning before routines are established, and NATO was no different. 
The common problem was that each NATO agency was being hampered in its work 
45 Ibid., p. 27. 
46 Lisa ~ierce, National Model United Nations 1995- North Atlantic Treaty Organization (New York , 
1995)' p. 3. 
47 Lord Ismay, 1954, p. 29. 
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because of lack of information from the other agencies.48 Dean Acheson describes 
NATO's structure as a body- actually twelve bodies- without a head.49 In order to solve 
this problem, the Defence Committee and the Defence Financial and Economic 
Committee were incorporated with the North Atlantic Council. 
The North Atlantic Council was now the only body where there was 
representation at the ministerial level. The replacement, the Financial and Economic 
Board, which was responsible to the Council Deputies, was established in Paris together 
with the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). 
The deputy, that each Foreign Minister used to have in NATO, was given the task 
of representing the whole government of the member country instead of being the deputy 
of the Foreign Minister. There was far too much work to do for the foreign ministers 
beside their other tasks, and by doing this NATO gained a more independent group of 
bureaucrats placed in Brussels, working with NATO-related business full time. The 
deputies became a permanent part of NATO, and an International Staff was set up to help 
them in their work.50 
An enlargement of NATO was also discussed at the beginning of the 1950s. The 
Kingdom of Greece and the Republic of Turkey both wanted to become members of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This fact made some member countries apprehensive 
because of Turkey's common border with the Soviet Union and Bulgaria. Some member 
governments also claimed that it would extend the commitment too much if these 
countries were accepted. After many discussions, the Council recommended that the 
48 Ibid., p. 43 . 
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member countries accept Greece and Turkey since the advantages of having them as 
members were seen as more important than the disadvantages. NATO hoped to decrease 
the tension between Greece and Turkey by accepting these two countries, and NATO 
would also gain a strategic advantage in the battle to contain Communism with that extra 
territory. Greece and Turkey became full members in 1952.51 
That same year the North Atlantic Council held a conference in Lisbon. One of 
the most important pending decisions at this conference concerned a coherent defence 
plan for NATO. A report from the so-called Temporary Council Committee was 
adopted.52 This report suggested that the member governments should build up a NATO 
force consisting of 50 divisions, 4,000 aircraft, and "strong naval forces" by the end of 
1952. German participation in the defence of Western Europe was also discussed at the 
conference. So far, negotiations between the occupying countries and Germany had 
failed. However, during the conference the Parties came closer to a solution. During a 
meeting in Paris, held in 1954, relations were regularized between the Federal Republic 
of Germany and the NATO allies. It was decided that the country should be brought into 
the framework of the defence alliance. The year after, on May 5, the Federal Republic of 
Germany became a member ofNAT0.53 
Another important decision made in Lisbon was to totally reorganize NATO's 
civilian bodies. The NAC became a permanent agency in Paris with each member 
49 Jordan and Bloome, 1979, p. 8. 
50 Erazim, 1994, p. 12. 
51 Lord Ismay, 1954, pp. 39-44. 
52 This Committee was set up to come up with a military acceptable plan for the defence of Western Europe. 
The Council could not be in session for the time necessary to deal with this problem. See Lord Ismay, 1954, 
p. 44. 
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government appointing a permanent representative, including a staff, which would help 
the political representative. Also, the Defence Ministers were to meet more than once or 
twice every year as had been the custom. In Lisbon Lord Ismay was also appointed the 
first Secretary General of NATO. 54 
IV. The Fledgling Begins to Fly 
A second phase of NATO's evolution commenced in 1956 when the Report on 
Non-Military Co-operation within NATO, better known as "the Report from the 
Committee of the Three Wise Men," was released and accepted by the Council. 55 This 
report gave strong emphasis to political consultations between the member countries. 
These consultations are still the core activities of NATO today. Conflicts among member 
countries were to be solved within NATO as far as it was possible. It was also suggested 
that member governments had to notify the other members if decisions were made that 
could affect the Alliance, so that consultations could take place.56 
In January, 1957, another agency was established, the NATO Political Committee. 
The members of this committee were to meet once every week to discuss political 
questions which concerned the members of the Alliance. In December 1957, the members 
met in Paris and agreed to establish stocks of nuclear warheads in the North Atlantic area, 
and to give the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) control over a number of 
intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs). The role of nuclear weapons in NATO's 
53 NATO Information Service, 1969, p. 37. 
54 Erazim, 1994, pp. 12-13. 
55 The members of this Committee were: Dr. Gaetano Martino (Italy), Mr Halvard Lange (Norway), and Mr 
Lester Pearson (Canada). See North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1989, p. 30 
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defence increased when the United States declared in 1962 that the country would not 
diminish its number of nuclear weapons, and that five Polaris submarines would be 
committed to NATO. A NATO nuclear force was built up and the member countries 
agreed to share information related to the nuclear field. 57 
In 1966, General de Gaulle, and France, decided to withdraw completely from 
NATO's military co-operation. This did not come as a surprise because the president had 
opposed the integrated military organization since 1959. The French felt that an 
integrated defence system would deprive the country the control over its own military 
forces .58 All NATO installations had to be removed from French soil. NAC headquarters 
was moved from Paris to Brussels. France's withdrawal from NATO's military side 
resulted in a minor reorganization of NATO's military structure. 59 The Standing Group 
was dissolved and the Military Committee was moved to Brussels from Washington. 
Smaller commands were integrated with larger ones and two new commands were 
formed in 1967: Iberian Command Atlantic (IBERLANT), and Naval Command South 
(NA VSOUTH).60 
The third phase began in 1967 when the Council approved the Report on Future 
Tasks, or the Harmel Report as it also was called. It suggested a continued strong defence 
along with an "open door policy" towards the East European countries where the 
members looked for peaceful solutions to the existing tensions. A couple of years later 
56 NATO Information Service, 1969, p. 39. 
57 Rengger, 1990, pp. 185-186. 
58 Ibid. , p. 186. 
59 Adding to the military changes, a new committee was established in 1969. It was called the Committee on 
Challenges of Modern Society. Its task was to consider problems of the human environment. See Rengger, 
1990, p. 188. 
37 
this report contributed to the new Ostpolitik which West Germany introduced. The result 
of Bonn's Ostpolitik was increased trade and decreased tension between East and West, 
and could ultimately be seen as one of the fundamental reasons behind the unification of 
Germany in October, 1990.61 
The era of detente saw the signing of the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin, in 
1971, and it helped to originate the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
which resulted in the Helsinki Final Act in 1975.62 Other conferences and discussions 
followed during the detente period, such as the Vienna conference on Mutual and 
Balanced Conventional Force Reductions, and in 1972, the Strategic Arms Limitations 
Talks (SALT I) was signed.63 
In June 1974, the "Ottawa Declaration on Atlantic Relations" was signed. It 
concerned the relations between the European NATO members on the one hand, Canada 
and the United States on the other. Some European countries feared that the United States 
would not come to their help if there was a crisis. The declaration stated continued strong 
ties over the Atlantic and a serious commitment to the Treaty.64 
The lack of general efficiency was still a problem for NATO, and in 1976 the 
Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) was created outside of NATO with the 
purpose of making the European armed forces more effective. The IEPG had four basic 
goals. First, money set-aside for research, development, and production of arms should be 
60 Ibid., pp. 186-187. 
61 Richard H. Ullman, Securing Europe (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,1991), p. 32. 
62 This act was about Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 
1989, p. 95. 
63 Ibid., pp. 32-33. 
64 See Erazim, 1994, p. 9.; See also North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1995, p. 306. 
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used as efficiently as possible. Second, there was a wish to increase the standardisation of 
weapon systems and weapons. The third goal was to maintain a European military 
industry based on advanced technological expertise. The final goal was to encourage co-
operation between North America and Europe.65 Together with the Eurogroup, 
established in 1968 to strengthen the European part of NATO, IEPG has given the 
European Parties a sense of greater responsibility, and it has softened the criticism from 
some Americans who believe that the United States carries too heavy a burden when it 
comes to the NATO commitment. IEPG has also helped the process of integration 
between the countries. 
The issue of burden sharing has always been a hot discussion topic in the past for 
NATO. The United States has always stressed shared responsibilities, even though the 
country has ended up paying more than its share. In fact, the North Atlantic Treaty might 
not have been ratified by the US Senate in 1949 if the American public and the Senate 
had known that the United States would subsidize Western Europe's defense for a long, 
long time.66 
During 1976, the Nuclear Planning Group and the Defence Planning Committee 
had meetings where it was decided that the NATO forces needed to be strengthened. The 
three elements of the NATO triad - strategic nuclear forces , theatre nuclear forces, and 
conventional forces - all had to be maintained. However, the need for strengthened 
conventional forces was especially stressed. Some 1115 combat aircraft were ordered by 
different members of the Alliance that year. In December 1979, the Foreign and Defence 
65 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1989, p. 23. 
66 Ted Galen Carpenter, Beyond NATO- Staying Out of Europe's Wars (Washington, D.C.: The Cato 
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Ministers of the Alliance met and came up with the "Twin-track" Decision. NATO would 
deploy the new long-range theatre nuclear weapons, the Pershing ll launchers, together 
with ground-launched cruise missiles in Western Europe. At the same time, the United 
States would try to negotiate with the Soviet Union to decrease the number of such 
weapons. The ministers also decided to make new proposals regarding mutually, and 
balanced force reductions (MBFR) in Central Europe.67 
Little changed within NATO during the first part of the 1980s. The Alliance was 
busy responding to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the events in Poland, as well 
as continuing efforts to reach an agreement on arms reductions.68 At a NAC meeting in 
Rome, May 4-5, 1981, a communique was released which stated that all Soviet troops 
must be withdrawn from Afghanistan, and that Poland must be given the opportunity to 
resolve its own problems. Spain became NATO's 16th member in 1982, and the debate 
about Spain's relationship to NATO continued throughout the 1980s. Later that year the 
"twin-track" decision of December 1979 was reaffirmed at a meeting for the heads of 
state in Bonn on June 10, 1982.69 NATO commenced the deployments of its intermediate 
range nuclear force in the United Kingdom in November, 1983.70 
The second half of the decade saw more important events and changes. The 
Intermediate Nuclear Forces Agreement (INF) was negotiated and signed on December 8, 
Institute, 1994 ), p. 32. 
67 Rengger, 1990, pp. 190-191. 
68 On December 11 , 1986, NATO Foreign Ministers issued the Brussels Declaration on Conventional Arms 
Control. It called for negotiations on conventional stability, aimed at eliminating existing disparities in 
Europe. It also called for further confidence and security-building measures.; See also North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization, 1995, p. 312. 
69 The "twin-track" decision was: 1) The deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe. 2) The 
continuation of arms control negotiations. 
70 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1995, pp. 308-311. 
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1987, between Presidents Reagan and Gorbachev. It meant a total elimination of 
Intermediate Nuclear Forces. There was also a discussion going on within NATO 
regarding the modernization of the Alliance's tactical nuclear forces . This was a sensitive 
subject after the heated discussion regarding the deployment of Pershing II and cruise 
missiles at the beginning of the decade. A decision was postponed until 1990. In 
December 1988, the Soviets suggested further disarmament, which increased public 
pressure within the NATO states. Here was the beginning of the legitimacy crisis for the 
Alliance. It was decided that NATO should follow a path of step-by-step modernization 
of its forces. The members welcomed the Soviet proposals, but did so with suspicion, 
since a Soviet superiority was perceived, especially when it came to conventional 
forces. 71 
The rise of President Gorbachev to power in the Soviet Union and the detente 
between East and West was what set changes/reformations in motion. It was 
foreshadowing an era filled with rapid political changes, which would force the Alliance 
to rethink its structure, strategies, and goals. 
V. The Years of Change 
One can say that NATO has entered its latest phase with the beginning of this 
period. The far-reaching transformation of Europe began in 1989 and culminated in 1990-
1991 when the two Germanies were unified, the Warsaw Pact was dissolved, and the 
Soviet Union broke up.72 The first free elections were held in Poland, and Tadeusz 
71 Rengger, 1990, pp. 193-194. 
72 Johan Ji:irgen Holst, The Future of NATO (Oslo: The Norwegian Atlantic Cornrnittee,l993), p. 3. 
41 
Mazowiecki became Prime Minister of the first non-communist government in 40 years. 
Hungary opened its Western border on September 10, 1989, which resulted in a flow of 
East Germans fleeing their country. Egon Krenz was elected new leader of the German 
Democratic Republic, and Hungary's Parliament adopted a new constitution which states 
that Hungary was going to be a free and democratic state with its first free elections in 
1990. November 1989, saw the Berlin Wall fall together with the communist leadership 
in Bulgaria. In December, Gustav Husak and his coalition government resigned, and 
Vaclav Havel was elected President of Czechoslovakia. Towards the end of the year on 
December 22, Nicolai Ceausescu's regime fell in Romania ending a very turbulent year 
for Europe.73 
After these events, the threats that NATO had been trying to stop or prevent were 
to a great extent no longer existent. Some historical revisionists would argue that the 
threats were never there in the first place, and that the Soviet Union had only responded 
to US imperialistic policies.74 The important thing to remember is that NATO countries 
perceived these threats and acted upon them. 
In hindsight, it turned out that estimated numbers of missiles and conventional 
weapons belonging to the Warsaw Pact were wrong. The Soviet Empire was no more. 
The defence organization had managed to reach some of its goals but the rapid changes 
had left the members confused. Although the Warsaw Pact had dissolved and the new 
Russia was handicapped, it was still a very strong military power. NATO had to adapt to 
the new situation or face the consequences. Many people were of the opinion that NATO 
73 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1995, pp. 315-319. 
74 Melvyn P. Leffler, "The Interpretive Wars over the Cold War, 1945-60" in Gordon Martel, American 
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had played its role and that it was time to come up with something new. The number of 
voices criticizing NATO soon decreased when people realized that NATO could change 
and still had a purpose. 
Its (NATO's) demise was frequently announced by all those pundits who saw the alliance as a 
waning institution haunted by a succession of debilitating crises. But the alliance refused to die. Its 
internal discussions and adjustments were a sign of vitality and relevance rather than indications of 
atrophy.75 
After the first shock had passed, NATO rapidly began a process of adaptation 
intended to cope with the changing world and the doubts directed toward NATO's 
legitimacy. NATO developed a new strategic concept, a new force structure, a new 
command structure and two new organizations, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council 
(NACC) and the Partnership For Peace.76 
VI. Conclusion 
This historical chapter has highlighted some of the more important events in the 
development of NATO with the purpose of giving the reader a better understanding of the 
more recent events. As we have seen, it took some time at the beginning of its existence 
for NATO to establish itself as an effective defence organization. NATO was built upon 
the threat perception that the Soviet Union was an expansive power. The pace of 
development of the organization, and the structure, were influenced by the relations 
between the two Cold War-blocs. It was President Gorbachev and his reforms that laid 
the foundation for the decrease in tension between the East and the West. This decrease in 
Foreign Relations Reconsidered - 1890-1993 (New York: Routledge, 1994), pp. 107-108 
75 Johan Jorgen Holst, A Changing NATO in a Changing Europe (Oslo: The Norwegian Atlantic 
Committee, 1992), p. 5. 
76 Ibid., p. 8. 
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tension caused the challenge towards NATO's legitimacy, which will be addressed in 
next chapter. It addresses the first part of NATO's response to the changing environment 
and the legitimacy crisis. The chapter takes into consideration the political and academic 
justifications that were used to maintain NATO as a security actor in Europe. 
44 
Chapter 2 
NATO's Response: Justifications Used to Maintain the Organization 
I. Introduction 
John Stuart Mill once said that organizations are what they are, no matter how 
they are structured, or run, due to the deliberate actions of people. 1 Mill meant that it is 
people and their actions as members that will determine the destiny of an organization. 
The Swedish political scientist, Olof Peterson, uses Mill's ideas and argues that there are 
four prerequisites for an organization to exist. The most fundamental one is active 
participation. Without active members, whether they happen to be individuals, 
organizations, or states, the organization is bound to wither away. The other three 
prerequisites depend upon the first one. The members must accept the organization and 
its goals. They must also work to maintain the organization, and finally the members must 
strive to fulfill the goals of the organization? 
One important aspect is missing in Peterson's reasoning above, and that is 
purpose. There must be a purpose for the organization. One can also say that the 
organization must be needed. Without this need, it does not matter how hard the members 
work, or how many goals the organization has set up. People inside and outside the 
organization must perceive this purpose in order to give the organization legitimacy. 
Without legitimacy, it will be extremely difficult to uphold the activities of an 
I OlofPeterson, Makt i det oppna samhallet (Stockholm: Carlsson Bokforlag, 1991), p. 137. 
2 Ibid. 
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organization.3 The philosophical and theoretical foundation of legitimacy is that power, 
which is not legitimate, is extremely fragile, or vulnerable.4 If organizations do not have 
the necessary legitimacy, their continued existence is threatened. 
One of the fundamental reasons for a decline in legitimacy of an organization is 
when its goal(s) is (are) fulfilled, or when its purpose has disappeared, as might be argued 
in the case of NAT0.5 In order to legitimize its continued existence, the organization 
must define new goals. This often means that the organization must go through changes. 
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is an excellent example of this. It 
was established to deal with war and major national catastrophes. After World War I, the 
organization found itself without tasks. A substantial loss of members was experienced 
together with declining contributions from the public. The organization managed to 
survive the crisis by adding a goal that made the general goal broader: to preserve and 
enhance peoples' state of health.6 Another example of an organization which has tried to 
survive by adding goals is the Western European Union (WEU). Created after World War 
II, the organization was completely overshadowed by NATO during the Cold War. In the 
1990s, WEU has stated that it has the intention of becoming NATO's European pillar.7 
3 Other factors than purpose influence the legitimacy of an organization. Efficiency is one example. (The 
author) 
4 Agneta Karlsson, Om strategi och legitirnitet COn Strategy and Legitimacy) (Lund: Lund University Press, 
1991), p. 31. 
5 There are two ways of looking at goals and organizations. In system theory, the goals are not determining 
the activities of an organization. Instead, they are looked upon as depending variables where the goals are 
results from the activities of the organization. In rational theory, goals are independent variables which are 
governing factors for the activities of an organization. It is argued here in this thesis, that the latter theory is 
closer to reality. (The author) For more information about the two theories see Bengt Abrahamson, Varfor 
fi nns organisationer? (Norstedts Forlag AB , 1986), p. 56. 
6 Arnitai Etzioni , Moderna organisationer (Modern Organizations) (Stockholm: Aldus/Bonniers, 1973), 
p. 25 . 
7 Daniel Farm, Europeiska Sakerhetsstrukturet - Anpassning till ett nytt konfliktmonster? diss. , Vaxjo 
University, 1996 (Vaxjo: Vaxjo University, 1996), p. 31. 
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However, it is not yet clear whether or not WEU will succeed in persisting because the 
Brussels Treaty, which established WEU, expires in 1998. 
NATO has faced the same sort of legitimacy challenge as the two organizations 
mentioned above in the late 1980s and early 1990s even though there were different 
reasons. The aim of this chapter is to study the debate that followed the legitimacy 
challenge and especially the parts of the debate dealing with the different reasons to keep 
the defence-alliance. As we will see, NATO has dealt with the legitimacy challenge by 
adapting to new realities. The two schools, neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism, 
look upon this adaptation in different ways as will be clear in this and later chapters. It 
has to do with the way their proponents regard different actors in society and how they 
look upon the world. The realist school, of which neorealism is an offspring, has been 
regarded as being more pessimistic in its outlook on the world, while the liberal school 
tends to take on a more positive outlook. These differences are reflected later in this 
chapter when the justifications for a continued existence of NATO are presented. 
Whenever the existence of an organization comes into question, there will always 
be people who argue that the organization should be dissolved. There are many different 
reasons for a decline in legitimacy, but when it happens, the most common response from 
the organization is a review process wherein the goals and the ways of reaching those 
goals are scrutinized. Two important factors in this process are past performances and 
future purposes. Even if these factors are subjective in their nature, it is possible in most 
cases to determine whether or not an organization has been successful, and whether future 
goals are realistic and purposeful. If the organization has done well in the past, 
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accomplished some of its goals, or made progress toward them, it is usually easier to 
maintain the organization than if there is a lack of success or progress. This is argued 
especially by neoliberal institutionalists who stress the positive characteristics of 
institutions. It is even easier to save an organization if its members and people outside the 
organization see a clear purpose for maintaining it. In NATO's case, the two schools see 
different purposes for maintaining NATO. Goals can be added, or reformulated, and the 
organization can be re-structured. The purpose needs to be real since true legitimacy, both 
external and internal acceptance of the organization is required for an institution or 
organization to survive in the long run. Most of the purposes presented by the schools are 
relevant and important, but it is once again stressed that we need to consider both sets of 
explanations in order to gain a full understanding of the legitimacy challenge and the 
following justifications. 
There is no doubt that NATO's credibility declined after the fall of the communist 
governments in Eastern and Central Europe in 1989. Long before 1989 there had been 
people who had argued that NATO was superfluous, too expensive and provocative. With 
the significant number of changes in Europe, NATO was perceived by many to suffer 
from a lack of rationale as can be seen in the public opinion polls conducted by the 
NATO Office of Information and Press. 8 Werner J. Feld discovered this as well: 
With the sharp reduction of the Soviet threat brought on by the disintegration of the Soviet 
government and society into a looser Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the rationale 
for NATO as the defender of Western values, so clearly visible over the last forty years, seems to 
be disappearing.9 
8 Erika v.C. Bruce, "The Image of the Alliance: Public Opinion Seminar Gauges Support", NATO Review 
vol. 41, no. 6 (December 1993), pp. 6-11. 
9 See Werner J. Feld, The Future of European Security and Defense Policy (Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 1993), p. 7.; see also S. Nelson Drew, Keith W. Dayton, William J. Erwin, Barry Keck and 
Philip C. Marcum, The Future of NATO (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1991 ), pp. 40-41 . 
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As has been stated, NATO was mainly a product of the Cold War, created and turned into 
a highly integrated defence alliance with the purpose of deterring Soviet aggression. The 
chance of future Soviet, or Russian, aggression was almost eliminated by the events in 
Eastern and Central Europe. NATO was left without a real task, or at least a credible one. 
The legitimacy of the organization was therefore in jeopardy. 
This chapter studies NATO's first response to the legitimacy challenge. It 
describes the attempts by politicians and academics to rationalize NATO's continued 
existence. There seems to be a lack of articles and books that fully takes on the task of 
describing and explaining the survival of NATO. The articles and books on the topic 
usually describe the changes without explaining why they have taken place, or why 
NATO survived. 10 On one hand, among those who attempt to explain NATO's survival it 
seems as if the more critical individuals tend to explain NATO's persistence by 
bureaucratic characteristics within the organization. 11 On the other hand, those who are 
more positively inclined toward NATO tend to explain the changes and NATO's survival 
as a natural process where the defence organization has adapted to new challenges and 
new tasks. 12 In both cases, the process is natural, but the second view encompasses many 
more reasons for survival other than bureaucratic inertia and internal demands to prolong 
10 This statement goes for most sources dealing with NATO used in this thesis. There are a few exceptions 
among which these can be mentioned: JohnS. Duffield, "NATO's Functions Mter the Cold War", Political 
Science Quarterly vol.109, no. 5. (Winter), 1994-1995., and Colin Mcinnes, "The Future of NATO" in 
(eds.) Cristoph Bluth, Emil Kirchner, James Sperling, The Future of European Security (Aldershot, UK: 
Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1995). 
11 See Richard K. Betts, "NATO's Mid-life Crisis" , Foreign Mfairs vol. 68, no. 2 (Spring 1989), p. 38.; see 
also Feld, 1993, p. 8. 
12 See Karl Kaiser, "Reforming NATO," Foreign Policy no. 103 (Summer 1996), pp. 129-130. See also 
JohnS. Duffield, "NATO's Functions after the Cold War", Political Science Quarterly, vol. 109, no. 5, 
1994-1995 (Winter), pp. 763-776. 
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the life of the organization. The different justifications used by politicians and academics 
will be presented below. 
It is the sense of the author that the initial sense of a legitimacy crisis for NATO 
did not last very long. When the Soviet Union was dissolved (formally in December 
1991), an anxiety over instability in Eastern Europe, and a fear of new problems and 
crises, replaced the feeling of euphoria. After the Cold War, a number of opinion polls 
were conducted in NATO countries. One example of such a poll is from West Germany 
where 80 per cent of people asked stated, as early as in October, 1988, that they "felt no 
military threat from Moscow" .13 Despite this, however, support for NATO did not 
decline, and in most cases there were no demands for a withdrawal of U.S. troops from 
Europe. 
Polls taken within the European NATO nations at the end of 1989 and early 1990 show that only 
in Spain was there strong sentiment that neither NATO nor the U.S. presence in Europe remained 
necessary for the preservation of the peace and Western security. 14 
It seems as if people in NATO countries thought that there were reasons for keeping 
NATO other than the old goal of deterring an aggressive Soviet Union. This illustrates the 
fact that there was not only a majority among politicians and academics that wanted to 
keep the defence alliance. 15 As stated earlier in the introductory chapter, there must be 
true legitimacy for an organization to survive. It is difficult to reach that kind of 
legitimacy if only the intellectual elite agrees on an issue. As the ICRC managed to find a 
new purpose, NATO has also managed to achieve the same. Even if it did not last for very 
13 "West Germans Shrug in a Poll" , International Herald Tribune October 25, 1988. 
14 Drew et al., 1991, p. 49. 
15 The lack of resistance from politicians and academics suggests that a majority of people in these two 
groups wished NATO to survive. (The author) 
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long, NATO had a legitimacy problem. So, why does NATO still exist? The most 
fundamental reason is that people still see a purpose for NATO. There are some people 
who see this purpose, or need, as artificial , and argue that NATO should be dissolved.16 
Yet, according to the polls, there seems to be a majority that continues to believe that 
there is a real and important purpose for NATO, even if the purpose differs from case to 
case. 
The thesis argues that this is indeed the case. There is a genuine need for NATO. 
There are tasks that best can be ~olved by the North Atlantic Alliance. It also argues that 
all of the following justifications had a bearing on NATO's persistence. Let us now tum to 
the justifications which were used by politicians and academics as a response to the 
changes in Europe in order to maintain the defence alliance. 
II. Justifications to Maintain NATO 
For the purpose of making it easier to comprehend the different justifications, it is 
argued here that it is possible to divide them into two major groups: external and internal 
justifications. As explained in the Introduction, external justifications are based on the 
assumption that there were external, positive and negative incentives or reasons, for 
keeping NATO as an organization. However, keeping NATO does not mean that the 
organization should be untouched. Most of the reasons and incentives are presented with 
the understanding that NATO has to change in an adaptation process. The internal 
justifications given are based on the assumption that there were inherent qualities within 
16 Carin Rostrup Lundquist, "Ar det dags att skrota NATO?" Helsingborgs Dagblad, November 18, 1990, 
sec. World News. 
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NATO that were worth keeping despite the fact that the danger posed by the Soviet Union 
was gone. 
As was also stated earlier, the events that directly led to NATO's decline in 
legitimacy and that laid the foundation for the debate about NATO's future were external 
events in Eastern and Central Europe. Of course, nobody can say what would have 
happened if President Gorbachev had not come to power, or if the Soviet Empire with its 
satellites in Europe had survived the upheavals. The events that took place did change the 
pillars of the international security framework, of which NATO was an intrinsic part. 
Forced by these external events, NATO had to take a look at itself in the mirror to 
scrutinize its own identity. It was not the first time and most likely not the last time 
either. 17 The arguments, which were used by the spectators who wanted to keep NATO, 
are described below. 
II a. Negative, External Justifications for Keeping NATO 
Beginning with the external justifications for keeping NATO, one can find two 
sorts: negative and positive justifications. Negative justifications are those based on 
continued threats, imagined or real. No matter how politicians and strategists argue, 
Russia is still seen as a threat in some respects. This is clearly the strongest justification 
used by neorealists. In a world characterized by anarchy and conflict, there is no reason to 
believe that Russia all of a sudden has become a friendly nation. It is true that an 
aggressive Russia would now have to cross Poland, Belarus and Ukraine in order to reach 
17 The organization went through an identity crisis when President Charles de Gaulle decided that France 
would leave NATO in 1966. 
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the heart of the West. 18 It is also true that Russia's military capabilities have decreased 
substantially, due to the break-up of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, the struggling 
economy and the disruption of Russian defence production. But Russia has not been able 
to convince the world, and the West in particular, that the Russian Bear has been tamed. 
Henry Kissinger, considered a hard-core realist, argued in his book Diplomacy: "Russia, 
regardless of who governs it, sits astride the territory Halford Mackinder called the 
geopolitical heartland, and is the heir of the most potent imperial traditions." 19 Part of the 
lasting suspicion is most certainly a remnant of the Cold War, but it would be wrong to 
argue that it is the whole story. Two events in particular have supported the neorealist 
perspective. First, there was the attempt to oust President Gorbachev in August 1991, by 
hard-line communists and parts of the Soviet military, indicating to the West that there 
were still people with power who would rather revert to the old system. The attempt also 
accelerated "the complete disintegration of the union and full delegitimization of the 
Communist Party, Soviet Union (CPSU)".Z0 The second event was the war in Chechnya 
where Russia used military force to try to stop an independence movement. This war 
revealed two things. First, that the quality and effectiveness of the Russian army was 
poorer than expected. More importantly, though, it showed the West that Moscow was 
still prepared to use brute force instead of negotiations to reach its goals. 21 
However remote or unthinkable a Russian all-out assault on Europe might be, 
18 Trevor Taylor, European Security and the Former Soviet Union (London: The Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, 1994), p. 8. 
19 Henry A. Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), p. 814. 
20 J. Philip Rogers, "Introduction: An Era of Revolutionary Change", in (ed.) J. Philip Rogers, The Future of 
European Security (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), p. 14. 
21 Tyler Marshall (for Los Angeles Times), "Kriget i Tjetjenien paverkar Vasteuropas forsvar", Tempus 
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Norway and Turkey still face powerful concentrations of Russian conventional forces 
near their borders. In addition, it is not yet possible to rule out the scenario where a new 
Russian government would return to a more confrontational posture, where expansion is 
on the agenda.Z2 Colin Powell expressed a similar sentiment in a 1991 speech: 
Soviet military power is hardly becoming irrelevant. Whatever the future hypothetical Soviet 
state may look like, it will still remain by far the strongest military power in Europe and Asia 
with millions of well-armed men in uniform.23 
In addition, there is still a chance that political and military forces within Russia and the 
new republics will attempt to assert power and influence.Z4 National sentiments and/or 
surfacing ethnic and other old conflicts could very well cause these kind of attempts. 
Such actions would create instability in Europe, and that instability could also be created 
by conflicts and insecurity within the Russian state. Political, economic and social 
instability constitutes a huge threat to the attempts made to turn Russia into a democracy . . 
At the moment, one of the most explicit threats to these attempts is posed by organized 
crime, which has spread quickly during the past decade. It is seen by many as a cancerous 
abscess in Russian society.25 
With an unstable society and a military, which is underfunded and in decay, 
Russia also poses an indirect threat through nuclear proliferation. Strategic nuclear 
weapons were stationed not only in Russia, but also in Belarus, Kazakhstan and in the 
Ukraine. After the break-up of the Soviet Union there were a number of "confusing and 
March 14-20, 1996, p. 12. 
22 Duffield, 1994-1995, p. 768. 
23 Colin Powell, "The Eisenhower Centenary Lecture: Military Realities and Future Security Prospects", 
RUSI Journal vol 136, no. 1 (1991), p. 18. 
24 Cristoph Bluth, "The View from the East" in (eds.) Cristoph Bluth, Emil Kirchner, James Sperling, The 
Fututre of European Security (Aldershot (UK): Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1995), p. 212. 
25 Louise I. Shelley, "Post-Soviet Organized Crime: A New Form of Authoritarianism", Transnational 
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occasionally contradictory series of statements, political commitments and legal 
undertakings".26 It is not only the risk of losing control of the huge number of nuclear 
weapons that bothers many Westerners. There is also a chance of so called know-how 
proliferation to countries or groups which are seen as unfit to possess nuclear knowledge 
by the countries in the West. It is estimated that there are 2,000 former Soviet citizens 
with fairly extensive knowledge of nuclear weapons design, and 3,000-5,000 people who 
know how to enrich uranium, and how to produce plutonium.27 Neorealists see all these 
dangers with Russia and argue that NATO must be kept to keep the balance of power 
when Russia is revived. 
NATO may enjoy an Indian Summer as Russia is temporarily paralyzed by internal strife and 
economic trouble; yet, as soon as the country manages to heal its wounds it will turn out to be 
the West's natural opponent again and pose a new threat to its interests.28 
Neoliberal institutionalists acknowledge these threats as well, but they do not 
argue that NATO should be kept because military force will be needed when Russia 
becomes a serious threat again. They do not agree with the picture of anarchy and chaos 
in the world order. They stress the positive effects an institution like NATO can have on 
the threats mentioned above. Cooperation is the keyword. Some NATO allies provide 
financial and technical assistance in the process of destroying nuclear weapons from the 
former Soviet Union.Z9 In addition, NATO is seen as a stabilizing factor for the region 
and for the newly democratized countries in Eastern and Central Europe. It is important to 
Organized Crime vol. 2, no. 2/3 (Summer/Autumn 1996), pp. 122-138. 
26 Taylor, 1994, pp. 16-17 . 
27 "West Europeans Push Conversion Plan for Russia", Defense News (February 28-March 6, 1994) 
28 Alfred van Staden, "A Lasting Alliance? On the Creation, Evolution, and Future of NATO", Acta Politica 
vol. 30, no. 3, 1995,p. 300. 
29North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Handbook (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 
1995), p. 83. 
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the West that these countries succeed in becoming stable democracies. All of Europe has 
much to lose if things go wrong. Failure could lead to "domestic turmoil, mass migration, 
armed conflicts, and even direct military threats to nearby NATO members".30 By 
maintaining NATO, the neorealist proponents argue, the West would have insurance in 
case of possible future Russian aggression. This, however, would not be the only threat-
perception that NATO would help to decrease. The neoliberal institutionalists argue that 
the organization would help monitor the return of nuclear weapons to Russia from the 
former republics, and to ensure that the risk of proliferation would be as minimal as 
possible. NATO would also act as a discouraging obstacle for extreme groups, which 
want to change Russia's course from democracy towards authoritarianism and an 
aggressive, external stance. 
It should be noted that Russia is not the only threat that was used to give 
legitimacy to NATO. Former Yugoslavia, and the bloody war which was fought there, has 
clearly shown what could happen when old conflicts surface after a long time. There are a 
number of conflicts in Eurasia which must be resolved in the future. Examples of such 
conflicts are border disputes, water disputes and minority groups and human rights 
issues.31 
Not all experts agree on the necessity of keeping NATO. A NATO that is re-
vitalized, and perhaps with more members, could be so provocative to Russia that a 
30 Duffield, 1994-1995, p. 771. 
31 One specific example of such conflicts is the water dispute between Hungary and Slovakia over the 
waterflow in the river Danube. See Zsofia Szilagyi, "Hungary Continues Presenting Its Case at the Hague" 
OMRI Publications, no. 46, March 6, 1997. 
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Russian threat would be all but guaranteed.32 Some of the sceptics still regard NATO as 
important, but want it to be cautious about changes and reforms. They use the old adage, 
"if it ain't broke, don't fix it".33 Russia has now conceded and agreed to a restricted 
expansion of NATO. This has, as an American diplomat quoted in Svenska Dagbladet 
said, resulted in a diminished cohesion within the Atlantic Alliance. Neorealists would 
probably see a pattern here. With a decreased threat from Russia, NATO's legitimacy 
decreases. 34 
Together, the perceived threats outlined above have been used as negative, 
external justifications for keeping NATO as the leading defence organization in Western 
Europe. Here follows a short summary of the threats: 
1) Social, economic and political instabilities in the former Soviet Union and its 
former satellites. 
2) A continued military threat posed by Russia 
3) Proliferation of weapons of mass-destruction 
4) Know-how proliferation regarding weapons of mass-destruction 
There is a very common argument used by both neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists 
in connection to these threat-based explanations, one that recognizes that NATO is the 
only organization which has the structure and the means to take on security tasks. NATO 
is a proven institution, and its success provides a good basis for future plans to enhance 
32 Colin S. Gray, "NATO: In Trouble at the Crossroads Again" , Strategic Review vol. 23, no. 3 (Summer 
1995), p. 8. 
33 Ibid. , p. 13. 
34 
Mikael Holmstrom, "Skugga over historisk dag for Nato" Svenska Dagbladet, July 8, 1997, sec. World 
News, p. 6. 
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security in Europe. 35 More than forty years of cooperation, plus extended jurisdiction, has 
made operations, such as the one in Bosnia and Herzegovina, possible for NATO. This 
argument will be discussed in greater detail later in this thesis. 
II b. Positive, External Justifications for Keeping NATO 
NATO's continued existence is not seen only as a response to threats. These 
justifications are used to a larger extent by neoliberal institutionalists. The former 
Secretary General of NATO, Manfred Worner, did not see NATO as obsolete just 
because the military threat from the Soviet Union had diminished. He saw NATO as a 
highly important security actor in Europe when he spoke in 1990. Even without changes 
in goals or structure, Worner argued that NATO had three important roles after the Cold 
War: 
1. In its role as a political alliance and community of values for the free world: 
as an instrument of change and peace-building. 
2. In its role as the transatlantic alliance: 
as the link and foundation that binds North America and Europe together in a 
community of destiny. 
3. In its role as a security alliance: 
as an instrument to preserve peace and as a framework of stability that is the 
precondition of positive change?6 
As we can see above, more positive reasons that stress cooperation and peace 
building are used in order to keep the institution of NATO alive. The neoliberal view is 
that it is possible to change the world for the better. NATO has taken the first role very 
35 Johan Jorgen Holst, A Changing NATO in a Changing Europe (Oslo: The Norwegian Atlantic 
Cornrnittee,1992), p. 19. 
36 Manfred Worner, "The Atlantic Alliance and European Security in the 1990s", Address to the Bremer 
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seriously. These positive justifications for NATO's survival argue that it is important for 
NATO to enhance its political identity. Since military security seems to be outdated, 
NATO should turn to the task of increasing security-building measures in Eastern and 
Central Europe. This led to: 
... the July 1990 London Declaration's invitation to former Warsaw Pact adversaries to establish 
diplomatic liaison missions at NATO, extending to the Rome summit's creation of the US-
German-proposed North Atlantic Cooperation Council, and continuing to the January 1994 
inauguration of the Partnership for Peace.37 
A majority of the changes in Chapter Three are based upon the idea that there was 
a need to seize the opportunity to extend security eastwards by opening up a dialogue as a 
first step. This wish was channeled through NATO. Here was a chance to decrease 
tension further, and an excellent opportunity to build a strong foundation for future 
cooperation between East and West. Not only did NATO's enhanced political profile 
result in the NACC and PFP, but also in the extended role of the Alliance as peacekeeper 
in Europe under the supervision of the UN and the CSCE. NATO's mission in former 
Yugoslavia has not been entirely successful, but the Alliance has tried to learn from its 
mistakes, and the newly formed Stabilization Force (SFOR- formerly known as 
Integration Force [IFOR]) will continue to work in Bosnia and Herzegovina.38 
Manfred Worner's second reason for keeping NATO, that of linking the United 
States with Europe, has been seen by many as the most critical function of NATO in the 
post-Cold War era.39 
Tabaks Collegium, Brussels, May 17, 1990. 
37 Philip Zelikow, "The Masque of Institutions", Survival- The IISS Quarterly vol. 38, no. 1 (Spring 1996), 
p. 11. 
38 Javier Solana, "Shaping NATO for the 21st Century", NATO Review vol. 45, no. 1 (January 1997), 
p. 3. 
39 Fergus Carr and Kostas Ifantis, NATO in the New European Order (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 
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The basic lesson of this century's two world wars is clear: Without a stabilizing U.S. political and 
military role, Europe is prone to conflict, and because of the U.S. national interests involved, the 
United States will inevitably become embroiled in those conflicts. It is much better to maintain a 
reduced but significant U.S. presence in Europe to help deter such conflicts than to withdraw and 
thereby make them more likely.40 
We see a neorealist tendency in the quotation above and in this reason. NATO is a 
stabilizing factor and the United States is the most important actor in the Alliance. This is 
to say that the Alliance still needs American leadership, particularly within the integrated 
military structure, and that Europe alone could not provide for its own security. It is a fact 
that the United States has the most capable military in the world both in terms of numbers 
and quality.41 However, this has nothing to do with the plans of strengthening the role of 
Europe, the so-called European Pillar, when striving for security on the European 
continent.42 NATO without the United States would be considerably less effective both 
when deterring possible enemies, and when extending security. Even French officials, 
who used to be the most vocal critics of U.S. involvement, now acknowledge and 
appreciate the enduring value of having U.S. forces on European soil.43 
The third role for NATO as a security alliance is more debatable since there are 
other organizations in Europe which can fulfill this role of being a forum and a 
framework for stability and peace. Both the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE - former CSCE) and the WEU are institutions which exist and function. 
1996), pp. 27-47. See also Stanley R. Sloan, NATO's Future: Beyond Collective Defense Report released 
September 15, 1995 (marvin.nc3a.nato.int:70/00/secdef/ind/natofutr.asc ). 
40 David M. Abshire, Richard R. Burt, R. James Woolsey, The Atlantic Alliance Transformed (Washington 
D.C. : The Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 1992), p. 2. 
41 Kevin F. Donovan, "The American Response to European Nationalism" in (eds.) David G.Haglund, S. 
Neil MacFarlane, Joel J. Sokolsky, NATO's Eastern Dilemmas (Boulder, CO.:Westview Press Inc. , 1994), 
p. 98. 
42 Stanley R. Sloan, "NATO and the United States" , in (eds.) S. Victor Papacosma and Mary Ann Heiss, 
NATO in the Post-Cold War Era, Does it Have a Future? (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), pp. 162-
165. 
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Some people argue that a European Security Organization (ESO) should be created, 
where countries from both Cold War alliances (NATO and WTO) should join to promote 
security and peace. Such an organization would be based upon the architecture and 
experience from these two institutions.44 The proponents of NATO, both neorealists and 
neoliberal institutionalists, argue that NATO is the only organization with the necessary 
experience and with the means to fulfill the task. It is argued that NATO's main 
competitors had problems of their own which effectively hindered them from becoming 
major security actors in Europe. CSCE was large and inflexible. Its rule of veto for the 
members meant that the institution lacked a powerful executive function. The European 
Union (EU), then the European Community (EC), moved toward a greater role in the field 
of security, especially with the Maastricht Treaty, but that changed when some EC 
members raised concerns about the Treaty. The WEU approved of EC's plan to increase 
the security role of Europe, but the motivation to go on disappeared when the spirit of 
reform died in the Community. The exclusion of the United States also made WEU a less 
attractive option. The lack of real alternatives was a strong justification for keeping 
NATO. NATO may not have been the perfect institution, but it was better than the rest of 
the options. There were no real demands to create something new, which made NATO 
look best, since of all the institutions with roots in the Cold War, NATO was considered 
to be the most successful one.45 
43 Duffield, 1994-1995, p. 766. 
44 Ullman, 1991, pp. 63-64. 
45 Colin Mcinnes, "The Future of NATO", in (eds.) Cristoph Bluth, Emil Kirchner, James Sperling, The 
Future of European Security (Aldershot(UK): Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1995), p. 88. 
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II c. Internal Justifications for Keeping NATO 
There are two major internal aspects that have been used to justify NATO's 
persistence after the legitimacy crisis and which will be highlighted here. Both are very 
much connected to the neoliberal school since they stress cooperation, communication 
and the positive outcomes of having institutions. The first internal justification deals with 
the channels of communication and cooperation that have developed and grown over time 
through the work of the Alliance. The second one deals with cost efficiency. 
The first internal justification can be labeled as reassurance, and both schools 
agree with this even though neorealists tend to stress the balance between states, while 
neoliberal institutionalists stress integration. "The continued existence of NATO, 
including its integrated military structure, and the U.S. military experience, assures its 
members that they have nothing to fear from one another."46 Together with other 
institutions as the EC, NATO has contributed to (West) Germany's integration in the 
West European family after World War II. This integration has meant greater stability, but 
there are still people who fear a resurrection of the "old Germany's" expansive policies. 
The military and political cooperation within NATO has meant a greater degree of trust 
between the members in the past,47 and it was argued that NATO would provide: 
... both an element of political stability in a rapidly changing environment, and a well-established 
forum for military consultation and cooperation, a forum whose cogs ... were well oiled, and whose 
mechanisms for consultation had a wealth of experience.48 
Closely connected to the first internal justification regarding NATO's channels of 
46 Duffield, 1994-1995, p. 773 . 
47 The only possible exception to this is Turkey and Greece, which still have conflicts among themselves to 
resolve. The conflict on Cyprus is only one example. There are territorial disputes as well. 
48 Mcinnes, 1995, p. 90. 
62 
communication and cooperation is JohnS. Duffield's argument, which is both neorealist 
and neoliberal in its nature, and which states that NATO reduces the possibility of 
conflicts among its European members in three ways: "it increases transparency; it 
inhibits the renationalization of their security policies; and by binding the United States to 
the continent, it ensures the maintenance of a balance of power in the region".49 
Duffield's first argument argues that the more open a system is, the more trust 
there will be. The fear of hidden agendas decreases, and if the openness is supplemented 
by intimate cooperation on different levels, there is a great chance for stability. NATO 
provided the West European countries with such an opportunity due to the historical 
circumstances that brought the Cold War. Just because the Cold War is over does not 
mean that this cooperation and trust become less important for the member states. The 
European Union could most likely take over this role, but here it is necessary to look at 
the whole picture. This internal reason for keeping NATO should be seen together with 
the rest of the reasons both external and internal. 
The second argument is the most neoliberal of the three. NATO countries 
formulate and execute their security policies not on a purely national basis, but as part of 
the Alliance. By doing so, the natural rivalry and competition is kept to a minimum. 
Participation in NATO's integrated military structure also helps to reduce military self-
sufficiency, which limits the opportunities for a country to build up an independent 
military capability. 
Finally, the security guarantees of the United States together with its forces in 
49 Duffield, 1994-1995, pp. 774-778. 
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Europe is one of the most important security factors for many of the European member 
states. U.S. participation in NATO enhances the belief that the Alliance offers greater 
security when it comes to external threats. The extensive military burden that the United 
States bears also allows the other members of NATO to limit their own armed forces. 
This is a matter of concern in some quarters of the United States. 
Another internal justification used by neoliberal institutionalists to keep NATO is 
that of cost efficiency. 5° For a country to maintain a credible military defence costs large 
sums of money, money that some countries are not willing to spend. One solution would 
be to remain in a collective group, such as NATO, where military integration, joint 
military maneuvers, and joint military projects would let a country keep its capability to 
feel relatively safe against military aggression.51 Most members would gain by 
continuing the cooperation. The exception might be the United States which bears the 
heaviest burden. The European countries cannot replace the American resources without 
immense efforts, which is seen as very difficult task with diminishing defence budgets 
throughout Europe. 52 At the moment, there are questions as to the costs of accepting new 
members into NATO. Even so, the costs of a NATO enlargement should be put into 
context. If more members lead to enhanced security, then the costs are worth paying if 
they are seen in a longer term. There are also strategic benefits to an enlargement. 53 
50 van Staden, 1995, p. 300. 
51 Zelikow, 1996, p. 12. 
52 Gunilla Herolf, NATO och det framtida Europa (Stockholm: Utrikespolitiska Institutet, January, 1994), p. 
2. 
53 Ronald D. Asmus, Richard L. Kugler, F. Stephen Larrabee, "What will NATO Enlargement Cost?", 
Survival- The IISS Quarterly vol. 38, no. 3 (Autumn 1996), pp. 25-26. 
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IV. Conclusion 
Continued threat from Russia, new threats from small heterogenous republics with 
internal economic, social and political conflicts, risk of proliferation concerning nuclear 
weapons, opportunities to extend security and increase cooperation between the East and 
the West, maintained links over the Atlantic Ocean, continued integration and 
cooperation within NATO aiming at continued reassurance between the members and 
cost efficiency. These are the most common justifications that were used to maintain 
NATO in the face of the legitimacy challenge. The negative, external justifications 
concentrate on continued threats, and are constantly used by neorealists. To them, things 
change in the world, but anarchy lingers on no matter what. There are periods of tension 
and there are periods of detente, and there is no reason to dissolve NATO just because we 
have entered a period with less tension in the world. The other justifications are used 
more often by neoliberal institutionalists, even though neorealists use some of them from 
time to time, or agree with others. There is no doubt that they all have had an impact on 
the decision to keep NATO as the most important security institution in Europe and North 
America. To what extent they have affected the decision-makers is very difficult to say. 
The justifications used by the two schools do not contradict each other. They live side by 
side and complement each other in a way that makes it very useful to use both when one 
tries to understand the world we live in. Neorealists have found a way to explain why 
NATO should continue to exist even though some of the threat perceptions may seem 
exaggerated. At the same time, neoliberal institutionalists have a strong case in an era 
where cooperation across borders is increasingly seen as the best tool to enhance security 
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and welfare. 
All these justifications helped to decide the fate of NATO, but there is another 
reason for the continued existence of NATO that has little to do with the justifications 
used by the two schools, but needs to be mentioned.54 This explanation is based on the 
self-preserving instincts, which can be found within any organization. Once an 
organization is well-established, deeply rooted interests will form, and which will attempt 
to maintain the organization, and thus oppose any radical changes to it.55 Werner J. Feld, 
among others, argues that any bureaucratic organization or institution has a wish to 
prolong its life. In addition, successful organizations usually want to extend their goals 
and grow as institutions. 56 Neoliberal institutionalists are probably those who will support 
this theory the most, even if they do not agree that it is the most important reason for 
NATO's survival. Colin Mcinnes argues that NATO was no exception to the rule, and 
that it was one of the reasons for NATO's survival. He says that "inevitable bureaucratic 
inertia and the self-preservation instincts of (international) civil servants" helped 
justifying NATO's continued existence. 57 Richard K. Betts explains this a bit further 
when arguing that NATO is quite institutionalized. NATO's "structure and consultative 
process have been thoroughly bureaucratised, and declarations of shared interests, 
objectives and commitment to cooperation have been ritualised". 58 This kind of 
continuity is part of the reason why East-West conflict during the Cold War was looked 
54 The explanation fits within some neo-liberal variants. (The author) 
55 Etzioni, 1973, p. 24. 
56 Feld. 1993, p. 8. 
n 8 11clnnes, 1995,p. 8 . 
58 Betts, 1989, p. 38. 
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upon as rather stable and predictable most of the time. 59 JohnS. Duffield has chosen to 
describe this phenomenon in a slightly different way. He argues that NATO had, and has, 
a special capacity for "institutional adaptation". 
This explanation is not enough to guarantee any legitimacy for NATO, but its 
bureaucracy is still to be reckoned with, and it helped NATO in its adaptation process. 
The process of adaptation or change began to some extent even before it was clear that 
NATO would survive. The result of this process is presented and described in next 
chapter that addresses the changes both in thinking and in structures that took place 
within NATO. 
59 Ibid. 
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Chapter 3 
Description of the Changes that Took Place within NATO 
I. Introduction 
The North Atlantic Alliance has been the most successful defensive alliance in history. As our 
Alliance enters its fifth decade and looks ahead to a new century, it must continue to provide for 
the common defence .. . We need to keep standing together, to extend the long peace we have 
enjoyed these past decades. Yet our Alliance must be even more an agent of change. It can help 
build the structures of a more united continent, supporting security and stability with the strength 
of our shared faith in democracy, the rights of the individual, and the peaceful resolution of 
disputes. We reaffirm that security and stability do not lie solely in the military dimension, and 
we intend to enhance the political component of our Alliance .. . 1 
This declaration was issued in London in 1990 by NATO. It reflected the fact that 
NATO members were urging to preserve the organization while also admitting that 
changes were needed. After having observed the justifications used to maintain the 
organization, it is now time to tum to the actual changes that have taken place within 
NATO since 1989. Therefore, this chapter will highlight and describe changes of NATO 
after the fall of Communism and the disintegration of the former Soviet Union (FSU). It 
examines the changes resulting from the decision to maintain NATO, and from the 
feeling of new or changed security needs in the North Atlantic area, and in Europe. It is a 
descriptive chapter. Attempts to explain the changes are presented in Chapter Four. 
The first part of this chapter addresses the changes regarding the new way of 
thinking- NATO's enhanced political role. Any organization which has existed for more 
than forty years is bound to have well-established routines, doctrines, and ways of dealing 
with day-to-day matters, as well as with crisis situations. This is true for NATO as well. 
The legitimacy challenge that NATO experienced resulted in the political and academic 
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debate that was discussed in last chapter. The legitimacy challenge also resulted in an 
urgent review of NATO's goals and procedures. As has been stated earlier in this thesis, 
the threat from the Soviet Union had changed dramatically which in effect deprived 
NATO of its raison d'etre.Z After some initial angst, the review commenced and results 
came quickly. Sections of this chapter deal with the North Atlantic Cooperation Council 
(NACC), NATO's new role as a peacekeeper, the Partnership for Peace programme 
(PFP), and the ongoing enlargement debate. These actions were taken as a result of 
NATO's enhanced political role and as a result of improved relations with the former 
communist countries. 3 
In the second part of the chapter, changes in military structure and in military 
strategies are discussed as the organization has changed its form as well in order to adapt 
to new strategies, new demands and new challenges. The creation of a new force within 
NATO, the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), gives NATO the 
opportunity to react quickly and to respond to different situations that may arise within 
the North Atlantic area. This force is meant to have the capability to operate outside 
NATO's traditional sphere of interest, as was seen during the war in the Persian Gulf. 
Another structural change that will be discussed later in the chapter is the Combined Joint 
Task Forces (CJTFs). CJTF makes it possible for non-NATO members to participate in 
NATO-led operations. Adding to this, a number of new bodies have been created within 
1 From the London Declaration on a Transformed Atlantic Alliance, the London Summit, July 1990. 
2 Colin Mcinnes, "The Future of NATO" in (eds.) Cristoph Bluth, Emil Kirchner, James Sperling, The 
Future of European Security (Aldershot, UK: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1995), p. 88. 
3 US Department of Defense, United States Security Strategy for Europe and NATO (Washington D.C.: 
Department of Defense, Office of International Security Affairs, June 1995), p. 8. 
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NATO among which the Senior Defense Group on Proliferation (DGP) is one.4 All 
changes described in this chapter lay the foundation for next chapter which attempts to 
explain why these changes occurred and why NATO has survived. 
II. Political Changes -A New Way of Thinking 
As was outlined in the last chapter, the collapse of the S viet Empire, and the 
disintegration of the USSR took away some of NATO's reason for existing.5 Parts of 
international relations theory state that military alliances formed to respond to one or 
more specific threats will disintegrate when the threats disappear. 6 Formed to respond to 
the military and ideological threat posed by the Soviet Union and its satellites, NATO 
was facing an imminent legitimacy crisis.7 
In response to that legitimacy crisis, the debate began w ich was addressed in 
Chapter Two. The conclusion, which a perceived majority of pe ple taking part of this 
debate agreed on, was that NATO was still needed. NATO began a transformation that 
still is taking place today. This process of change began in 1990 as events continued to 
occur which affected security structures in Europe. Reasons, both external and internal, 
were used to help this transformation. The foreign ministers of the Alliance met in 
Turn berry, UK, in 1990, and their conclusion was that NATO could become one of the 
4 Ibid., pp. 8-9. 
5 See Ted Galen Carpenter, Beyond NATO: Staying Out of Europe's Wars (Washington: The Cato Institute, 
1994), p. 109.; and Fergus Carr and Kostas Ifantis, NATO in the New European Order (New York: St. 
Martin' s Press, Inc.,1996), p. 62. See also Robert Levine, Transition and Turmoil in the Atlantic Alliance 
(New York: Taylor & Francis Inc., 1992), p. 2. 
6 David Haglund (ed. ) Will NATO Go East? (Kingston , Ont. : Queen' s University, 1996), p. 19.; See also 
Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University ress, 1987) 
7 JohnS. Duffield, "NATO's Functions after the Cold War", Political Scienc-e Quarterly, vol. 109, no. 5, 
1994-95, pp. 764-765 . 
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major architects for building a new and peaceful order in Europe.8 They stated: 
Although the prevention of war will always remain our fundamental task, the changing 
European environment now requires of us a broader approach to sec rity based as much 
on constructive peace-building as on peace-keeping.9 
It was time for NATO to change. The first stepping-stone was NATO's London 
Summit in July 1990. Russia was declared to no longer be an adversary of the members 
of the Alliance. 10 It was admitted that the European security envu onment was changing. 
As was stated in the introduction to this chapter, NATO sought to increase its political 
role and to open up a dialogue with the Eastern European countries. NATO phrased this 
goal as a task to "reach out to the countries of the East which were our adversaries in the 
cold war, and extend to them the hand of friendship" ." 
It is interesting to note that NATO's perception of security began to change along 
with the development process. Fergus Carr and Kostas Ifantis argue that NATO began to 
recognise the emergence of a European security architecture where security in the new 
Europe had more than one dimension. Security, according to these authors, embraces 
economic, political , ecological, and defence dimensions and not just the military view of 
security. 12 NAC saw institutions like the Alliance, the EC, the WEU, and the Council of 
Europe as key institutions in this security structure. NAC also argued that the European 
members of the Alliance should get an enhanced role and responsibility when it came to 
transforming the Alliance. 13 All security organizations in Europe should work together in 
8 Carr and lfantis, 1996, p. 63. 
9 North Atlantic Council, "Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council at Turnberry," NATO Review 
vol. 38, no. 3, 1990. 
10 US Department of Defense, 1995, p. 7. 
11 Richard H. Ullman, Securing Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), p. 75. 
12 Carr and Ifantis, 1996, p. 64. 
13 Ibid. 
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this new security structure: 
The Council welcomed efforts further to strengthen the security dimension in the process of 
European integration and recognise the significance of the progress made by countries of the 
European Community towards the goal of political union, including the development of a 
common foreign and security policy.14 
Even though other security organizations have a role to play, NATO has a 
"particular position" due to its capabilities. 15 At a ministerial meeting in Copenhagen in 
June 1991, the Alliance identified four core security functions that it would perform in 
Europe: 
1) To provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable security environment 
in Europe, based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the 
peaceful resolution of disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate 
or coerce any European nation or to impose hegemony through the threat or use of 
force. 
2) To serve, as provided for in Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, as a 
transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on any issues that affect their vital 
interests, including possible developments posing risks for members' security, and 
for appropriate coordination of their efforts in fields of common concern. 
3) To deter and defend against any threat of aggression against the territory of any 
NATO member state. 
4) To preserve the strategic balance within Europe. 16 
These four security tasks became part of the "new Strategic Concept" that was 
firmly outlined later in November, 1991, at the Rome Summit. At the meeting in 
Copenhagen, a statement was also issued that would come to guide NATO's policies in 
the future, and which would form the foundation of NATO's attempts to extend security 
in Europe. It declared: "We do not wish to isolate any country, nor to see a new division 
14 Ibid. 
15 By capabilities NAC means the military capabilities and the well-established structures that NATO has 
developed. 
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of the Continent. Our objective is to help create a Europe whole and free." 17 
NATO's new Strategic Concept reaffirmed the four core functions of the Alliance 
outlined in Copenhagen, and broadened the concept of security caused by the changing 
security landscape. The new strategy reaffirmed the importance of collective defence, 
while at the same time it stressed co-operation and dialogue with the former Warsaw Pact 
countries. For the first time ever, the task of addressing security threats beyond the North 
Atlantic area was identified, a task which lay the foundation for future peacekeeping and 
coalition crisis management operations. The document also addressed the changing threat 
against the Alliance. The threat was no longer a massive military attack from the East, but 
had rather turned into diverse and "multidirectional" risks 18 such as: 
... the adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social 
and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced by 
many countries in central and eastern Europe. 19 
These new risks, together with possible "out-of-area" missions for NATO, made it 
necessary to radically restructure "the forces and missions of NATO's integrated military 
commands"?0 
The new Strategic Concept document repeated the statement that even though 
other European organizations such as the European Community, West European Union, 
and Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, are important for an emerging 
security identity, NATO is the only institution which can perform the four security 
16 North Atlantic Council, "Ministerial Meeting, Denmark," NATO Review vol. 39, no. 3, 1991 
17 US Department of Defense, 1995, p. 8. 
18 Werner J. Feld, The Future of European Security and Defense Policy (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 1993), pp. 15-16. 
19 Carr and lfantis, 1996, p. 75 . 
20 US Department of Defense, 1995, p. 8. 
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functions mentioned above. It therefore was seen as the "essential forum for consultation 
and the forum for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defense 
commitments of its members".21 
II a. The North Atlantic Cooperation Council 
The North Atlantic Cooperation Council was part of the "extended hand of 
friendship" towards the East that was expressed during the London Summit. The actual 
council was established in late December, 1991, immediately following the Rome 
Summit in November of the same year where all details had been decided. NACC would 
provide NATO and the East European countries with a forum in which common security 
concerns, defence planning, conceptual approaches to arms control, democratic concepts 
of civilian-military relations, civil-military relations of air traffic management, and how 
to change military production into civilian production, could be discussed?2 NACC's first 
meeting included the sixteen members of the Alliance and foreign ministers from 
Bulgaria, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Romania, and also a representative from the Soviet Union. When the Soviet 
Union disintegrated, many of the new republics joined NACC.23 
NACC did not turn out to be the success everybody had hoped it would be. By 
1993, many countries and people were disillusioned with the council. One of the reasons 
21 Feld, 1993, p. 16. 
22 See William Yerex, "The North Atlantic Cooperation Council: NATO's Ostpolitik for Post-Cold War 
Europe", in (eds.) David G. Haglund, S. Neil MacFarlane, Joel J. Sokolsky, NATO's Eastern Dilemmas 
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc. , 1994 ), p. 181.; and Gunilla Hero if, NATO och det framtida Europa 
(Stockholm: Utrikespolitiska Institutet, January, 1994), p. 4. See also Feld, 1993, pp. 15-16. 
23 Yerex, 1994, p. 183. 
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for that was that it was not enough to discuss different issues. NACC lacked a 
"machinery" for action, which made it pointless to discuss some issues of importance.24 
Secondly, and more importantly, NACC did not provide the former Warsaw Pact 
countries with any security guarantees, which they very much wanted. They began to 
suspect that NACC was a way for NATO to avoid bringing Eastern countries closer. They 
found that the dialogue and the cooperation were not enough? 5 
William Y erex, a Canadian Lieutenant Colonel, points out that it was the former 
communist countries which "clearly identified NATO as the focal point for security and 
stability" in Europe.26 This honour puts NATO in a difficult position however. Russia 
must not feel threatened by NATO's moves or by the enthusiasm that has been shown, 
when it comes to NATO, especially by the Central European countries. A more or less 
stable and secure Russia is essential for any serious attempts to enhance security in 
Europe. 
II b. Peacekeeping 
In June 1992, the Strategic Concept was extended. The extension discussed the 
necessity to adopt preventive diplomacy and crisis management, even outside NATO's 
territories. After being charged with crisis management outside the Alliance area, the 
North Atlantic Council decided that NATO would undertake peacekeeping operations 
outside the North Atlantic area on a case-by-case basis under CSCE (now the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE]), and under the United 
24 Haglund, 1996, p. 25. 
25 Mcinnes, 1995 , p. 93. 
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Nations.Z7 According to James Goodby, there are five different sorts of peacekeeping 
operations which might be needed in the future: 28 
1) To carry out humanitarian functions, such as organising shipments of food and 
medicine under hazardous conditions; 
2) To observe a situation that contains some risk of conflict; 
3) To patrol borders or other sensitive areas; 
4) To establish a buffer zone between adversarial military forces; 
5) To protect enclaves of ethnic minorities.Z9 
The Defence Planning Committee (DPC) ordered its permanent session to study 
peacekeeping, and come up with measures which would improve NATO's peacekeeping 
capabilities within areas such as command and control, logistic support, infrastructure, 
training and exercises.30 Studies concluded that there were three main areas where NATO 
could support peacekeeping operations: 
a) Non-material resources, e.g., information, expertise, coordination with other 
agencies. 
b) Material resources, e.g., Alliance infrastructure, transportation, 
telecommunications, logistic support. 
c) Constituted military forces such as the Standing Naval Force Atlantic, the 
Standing Naval Force Mediterranean, elements of the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps 
(ARRC) and the NATO Airborne Early Warning Force, forces from individual 
Allied nations to include military combat units and support elements.31 
26 Yerex, 1994, p. 185. 
27 Richard Latter, NATO in the New Europe (London, Wiston House Conference Centre, 1995) Wilton 
Park Paper no. 99., p. 15. 
28 James Good by is a Professor at Carnegie-Mellon University, and was head of the U.S. delegation to the 
Stockholm Conference on disarmament in Europe, and vice-chairman to the START talks. 
29 James E. Goodby, "Peacekeeping in the New Europe", in (ed.) J. Philip Rogers, The Future of European 
Security (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), pp. 101-102. 
3° Carr and Ifantis, 1996, p. 120. 
31 Ibid., pp. 120-121. 
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NATO would also take part in operations such as: "monitoring cease-fires; withdrawals 
of forces; supervising disarmament and control of weapons; escorting, controlling and 
protecting convoys; creating safe corridors; creating and monitoring buffer zones; 
creating and supervising disarmed or neutral areas; establishing communications; 
providing a full range of logistical assistance; removing hazardous munitions and 
commanding, coordinating and/or controlling peacekeeping forces from NATO and from 
non-NATO countries and regional organisations".32 
We have already seen NATO involved in a "peacekeeping" operation in the 
former Republic of Yugoslavia under the umbrella of the United Nations. There have 
been a number of problems for NATO in its role as a peacekeeper. These have arisen 
from the fact that there have been mutually incompatible aims, and these have limited the 
chances for an effective NATO military contribution.33 NATO has supported the UN in 
former Yugoslavia by planning the operation, and from 1992 and onwards, NATO naval 
forces have, together with the WEU, monitored the Adriatic part of the Mediterranean. In 
November 1992, these forces helped enforce the UN's arms embargo against the former 
Yugoslavia and the economic sanctions imposed by the UN on Serbia. Ten NATO 
members sent troops to be part of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) 
operation, and an operational NATO headquarters was made available. NATO air forces 
were used to enforce the no fly zone over Bosnia, and they were also used to protect the 
UNPROFOR forces on the ground.34 NATO actions in the area were criticised when the 
Alliance launched its fi rst attacks since it was founded. A number of actors were critical 
32 Ibid. , p. 121. 
33 Latter, 1995, pp. 6-7 . 
77 
of the use of violence in a peacekeeping operation. President Yeltsin denounced the 
actions, and said that NATO had "appropriated the role of judge and judicial executor" 
and that NATO was exceeding the mandate of the UN.35 
II c. Partnership for Peace 
Former US Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin, announced the idea of the PFP 
programme at a meeting in Travemunde, Germany, on October 20-21, 1993. However, it 
was not until the Brussels Summit in January, 1994, that the programme was embraced 
by the whole Alliance.36 The PFP initiative was an attempt to go beyond the dialogue and 
cooperation that had begun with the NACC. The general idea was that NACC would take 
care of the political cooperation while PFP would handle the military cooperation. 37 The 
idea behind the PFP was to "forge a real partnership with the new eastern democracies as 
well as other European states ... ".38 The programme was placed under the authority of the 
NAC, and all participants were welcome to take part in political and military activities 
regarding the partnership. All new countries that were willing to participate were invited 
to sign a Framework Document in which they promise to preserve democratic structures, 
and to maintain the principles of internationallaw.39 Partnership for Peace is declared to 
seek: 
34 Carr and Ifantis, 1996, p. 122. 
35 Canadian Press, "Serb civilians scurry for cover as NATO jets step up bombing," The Vancouver Sun 
September 8, 1995. 
36 David G. Haglund, "NATO Expansion: Origins and Evolutions of an Idea", in (ed.) David G. Haglund, 
Will NATO Go East? (Kingston, Ont. : Queen's University, 1996), p. 26. 
37 Herolf, 1994, p. 4. 
38 US Department of Defense, 1995, p. 10. 
39 Carr and Ifantis, 1996, p. 141. 
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1) facilitation of transparency in national defence planning and budgetary processes; 
2) ensuring democratic control of defence forces; 
3) maintenance of the capability and readiness to contribute, subject to constitutional 
considerations, to operations under the authority of the UN and/or the 
responsibility of the CSCE; 
4) the development of cooperative military reductions with NATO, for the purpose 
of joint planning, training, and exercises in order to strengthen their ability to 
undertake missions in the fields of peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian 
operations, and others as may subsequently be agreed; 
5) the development, over the longer term, of forces that are better able to operate 
with those of the members of the North Atlantic Alliance.40 
After signing the Framework Document it is up to the country seeking 
membership to decide how extensive the commitment will be, and what resources that 
country is willing to commit to the relationship.41 The final agreement is formalized in an 
agreed Individual Partnership Programme worked out on a bilateral basis. The overall 
work programme produced by NATO and the individual programmes will be updated 
every year. 42 
In addition to PFP's tasks, NATO has promised to consult with any PFP member 
that perceives a direct threat to "their territorial integrity, political independence or 
security".43 NATO will go no further than that, and no real guarantees will be given. Even 
though PFP was created to ward off early demands from the central and eastern European 
countries to become members of the Alliance, it is a fact that one of the functions of the 
PFP is to build a foundation for new states to become members when NATO decides to 
40 The Framework Document for Partnership for Peace. 
41 Carpenter, 1994, p. 25. 
42 US Department of Defense, 1995, p. 10. 
43 Latter, 1995, p. 12. 
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expand.44 Active participation in PFP and its activities will play an important role in the 
process that NATO is going through when it comes to expanding the Alliance.45 NATO 
has decided to make PFP stronger. Military cooperation between members and non-
members will be intensified, which will make it easier to expand the Alliance in the 
future. 46 
The idea of expanding NATO has meant a number of problems, some of which 
have turned out to be difficult to solve. The most acute problem has been to convince 
Russia that NATO is not a threat. Moscow first welcomed NATO's decision to launch the 
PFP programme because it meant opportunities for military co-operation and it looked as 
an alternative to an enlargement of the Alliance. That changed when NATO became more 
and more convinced that it should expand the number of members, and said so publicly. 
Conservative forces in Russia saw an enlargement as an aggressive move by NATO, and 
a blow against Russia's pride.47 A policy document regarding the US Government's view 
on NATO from 1995 stated that: 
... the United States considers the Partnership an integral and lasting part of the new European 
security architecture. As the Alliance has made clear from the outset, participation in PFP will 
not guarantee admission to NATO but it is the path to membership for countries wanting to 
join.48 
It did not help that the Alliance attempted to convince Russia that the PFP is not 
44 Trevor Taylor, European Security and the Former Soviet Union (London: The Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, 1994), p. 118. 
45 John Borawski, "Partnership for Peace and beyond," International Affairs Vol. 71 No.2 (April 1995), p. 
234. 
46 Holmstrom, July 8, 1997, p. 6. 
47 Russia and NATO reached an accord in mid-May wherein Russia allows NATO to expand eastwards, but 
will remain officially opposed to the expansion. Geoffrey York, "Russia, NATO Reach Accord", The Globe 
and Mail May 15, 1997, A1 
48 US Department of Defense, 1995, p. 12. 
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constructed as a defence, but rather as a safety insurance.49 
As of September 1995, 27 countries were participating in PFP's activities in 
addition to the original 16 members of NATO. Some of them might one day become full 
members, but for those which do not, the NACC and PFP will continue to be a platform 
for active cooperation. 5° So far, a number of important developments have taken place for 
PFP. Among the 27 non-NATO countries that joined in September 1995, all Warsaw Pact 
countries, and their successor states, except Tajikistan, were participating. Second, a 
Partnership Coordination Cell has been established at Mons, Belgium with the task of 
carrying out coordination and planning necessary to implement PFP programmes. Most 
participants have a liaison officer stationed there. Third, the initial Partnership 
Programme from 1994 has been extended for 1995 to include hundreds of training, 
planning and consultation activities involving most of NATO's principal committees. 
Fourth, most partners have concluded agreed Individual Partnership Programmes, and 
updating processes of these programmes have already taken place. Fifth, there have been 
a number of different exercises involving forces from the different countries and more are 
being planned.51 Finally, a PFP defence planning and review process (PARP), was 
launched in January 1995. The main goal with PARP is to develop partner forces in order 
for them to be able to operate effectively with NATO forces. In 1995, 14 partners had 
chosen to be part of this process. 52 
49 Henry Kissinger, "NATOs rolllir linnu inte overspelad," Svenska Dagbladet August 27, 1994, sec. Under 
Strecket 
50 Gebhardt von Moltke, "NATO moves towards enlargement," NATO Review January 1996, p. 5. 
51 For a specified list of exercises please see North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Handbook 
(Brussels: NATO Office oflnformation and Press, 1995), pp. 254-259. 
52 US Department of Defense, 1995, pp. 10-11. 
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The most recent plan is to strengthen Partnership for Peace in order to avoid a 
situation where countries between NATO and Russia, such as Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania, become gray zones, at the same time as NATO prepares itself for a first 
expansion process where Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic are the first 
candidates.53 
II d. NATO's Enlargement Debate 
Closely related to the Partnership for Peace programme is the debate concerning 
whether or not to expand the number of members of NATO. This debate commenced 
soon after the fall of Communism in Central and Eastern Europe. In 1990, the Soviet 
Union agreed to sign the "Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany," 
which stated that the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) could join the Federal 
Republic of Germany, and through that also join NATO, provided that no foreign troops 
were stationed in the former GDR.54 It has been argued that Soviet leaders received oral 
reassurances in 1990 that NATO would not expand more than including former East 
Germany. 55 Ever since the German reunification, several other countries, such as Poland, 
the Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary, and the Baltic States have sought to gain 
security guarantees from West European institutions. A membership in NATO, with its 
structure and resources, seemed to be a good step to take in addition to closer relations 
with the EU. NACC, and to some extent also PFP, were disappointments for those 
53 Mikael Holmstrom, "USA ser Sverige som nyckelpartner," Svenska Dagbladet August 18, 1996, p. 8. 
54 Borawski, 1995, pp. 237-238 . 
55 Fredrik Braconier, "Ryssland-Nato eniga om avtal ," Svenska Dagbladet May 15, 1997, sec. World 
News. 
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countries which quickly wanted to integrate with Western security. 56 It is not only the 
former communist countries that have argued for an expansion. Prominent voices in the 
West have argued that NATO must expand or die, or as a diplomat said: It must "go out 
of area or out of business".57 At the NATO Summit in Madrid, 8-9 July, 1997 it was 
decided to invite Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary to join NATO. These three 
countries will begin negotiating in order to become full members in 1999 when NATO 
has its 50th birthday, and on the lOth anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall. 58 
Romania and Slovenia were not accepted, but are next in line if the Alliance decides to 
expand in the future. Countries like Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Slovak Republic, 
Bulgaria and Albania have shown a strong interest in becoming members as well, but 
they are not considered to have fulfilled the requirements of political and economic 
stability yet. 59 
The road to the decision to expand NATO has been long and complicated. The 
Alliance has had a hard time dealing with the enlargement idea. This is explained by 
different opinions among its own members, and because of the problem with Russia's 
disapproval of an expansion . The need to extend stability eastwards was a primary 
concern, but NATO tried at the same time to be sure that the benefits of collective 
defence would not be sacrificed. There is also an economic question. Nobody knows how 
much it will cost to bring in new members. The big question is: "How could central 
56 Hans Christian Hagman, "Morgondagens NATO- fnigor kring alliansens expansion," Internationella 
Studier No. 4 (1993), p. 10. 
57 Karl-Heinz Kamp, "The Folly of Rapid NATO Expansion," Foreign Policy no. 98 (Spring 1995), 
p. 116. 
58 Mikael Holmstrom, "Tidtabell klar fOr utvidgat Nato", Svenska Dagbladet December 11, 1996, sec. 
World News, p. 9. 
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European security be promoted, Russia not provoked, and the alliance kept cohesive and 
purposeful, all at the same time?"60 Germany, Canada and the United States have been 
the nations most in favour of an expansion. The pro-expansionists talk about "exporting 
stability" and a "widening of the community of democracies" but there are also pitfalls to 
enlarging the Alliance according to Karl-Heinz Kamp, head of the Foreign Security 
Policy Section at the Konrad Adenauer-Stiftung. Adding to the fact that nobody knows 
how much it will cost, Kamp argues that PFP should be more appreciated for letting the 
security environment in Europe become clearer, and for moving ahead slowly. He also 
says that proponents for an expansion forget how complicated relations between Russia, 
Central Europe, and the West really are. 61 
The extent of these complicated relations were shown in 1993 when President 
Y eltsin first expressed his view that Polish and Czech memberships would not pose a 
threat to Russia. He announced not long after that through the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Andrei Kozyrev, that Russia was determined to stop any attempts from former 
Warsaw Pact allies to join NAT0.62 The Russians wanted the CSCE to be the tool used to 
enhance security in Europe. Some NATO members argued that by considering Russia's 
opinion, NATO gave Russia veto power when it comes to enlargement. This fear has now 
disappeared since NATO has decided to expand. Russian threats have become warnings 
instead. Russia's new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jevgenij Primakov, argues that an 
expansion of NATO will inevitably lead to a new division of Europe. Russia is still 
59 Mikael Holmstrom, "Skugga over historisk dag for Nato", Svenska Dagbladet July 8, 1997, p. 6. 
60 Borawski, 1995, p. 236. 
61 Kamp, 1995, p. 118. 
62 See Hagman, 1993, p. 10. ; See also Carr and Ifantis, 1996, p. 140. 
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against an expansion, but is prepared to keep a dialogue with the Alliance going.63 After a 
meeting between President Clinton and President Yeltsin in Helsinki, March 21, 1997, it 
was decided that the time had come to negotiate a special agreement. The Russian 
demand for a veto was turned down. President Clinton stated that Russia would be 
allowed to have a voice, but not a veto. The final statement from the meeting contained, 
among other things, these four points: 
1) The two presidents had "agreed to disagree" regarding the issue of NATO 
enlargement. 
2) There were guidelines for the special agreement between NATO and Russia 
NATO is prepared to agree that no nuclear weapons will be stationed in new 
member states. 
3) A general agreement that OSCE should be strengthened in order to achieve a 
more stable and integrated Europe. 
4) There was also an urgent request that all CFE-signatories (Conventional Armed 
Forces in Europe Treaty) should ratify the agreement, and a request that a new 
framework for a revised CFE treaty should be produced during the 
spring/summer. 64 
Even though NATO has promised not to place any nuclear weapons in the new member 
states, they will still be protected by NATO's nuclear umbrella.65 On May 14, 1997, this 
special agreement was signed. It regulates both Russia's cooperation with NATO and 
Russia's influence in the enlargement process. It was decided that a permanent council 
will be set up where Russia shall take an active part. Russia will not have a veto against 
NATO expansion. Another important part of the document is NATO's "three nos" 
63 Mikael Holmstrom, "Ryssland valjer forsonlig linje mot Nato", Svenska Dagbladet December 12, 1996, 
sec. World News, p. 8. 
64 Karin Henriksson, "Natoutvidgning trots ryskt missnoje" , Svenska Dagbladet March 22, 1997, sec. World 
News, p. 6. 
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regarding nuclear weapons. In a considerable time in the future, NATO has no reason, no 
plan and no intention to change its deployment of nuclear weapons. However, NATO 
states clearly that it intends to keep its freedom of action in case the security environment 
changes.66 
The new NATO has been characterised as a train, where the task of the members 
is to get four new cars rolling before the summit in Madrid in 1997.67 The first car is the 
enlargement itself. NATO must keep its promises to the East European states. The second 
car will be a new, extended Partnership for Peace for those countries which will not be 
accepted in the first round of new members (for example the Baltic states), or for those 
which have no intention to join the Alliance (Austria, Finland and Sweden). The United 
States has suggested that an Atlantic Partnership Council (APC) be established with the 
purpose of tying countries that belong to both NACC and PFP closer together and 
increasing the political co-operation. They will be able to send ambassadors to NATO 
and also have officers stationed at NATO headquarters which are responsible for 
peacekeeping operations.68 The third car is a new military command structure where both 
France and Spain will take part after decisions to join the military cooperation. France 
decided to join in December 1995, and Spain joined in November 1996.69 There are 65 
NATO commands today, but this number will be reduced to 35. These will also be taking 
on the new tasks of crisis prevention and peacekeeping. NATO resources will become 
65 Mats Svegfors, "Nato vaxer och narmar sig", Svenska Dagbladet December 12, 1996, sec. Editorial 
66 Fredrik Braconier, "Nato behaller sin handlingsfrihet", Svenska Dagbladet May 16, 1997, sec. World 
News, p. 6. 
67 Holmstrom, December 11, 1996, p. 9. 
68 Henrik Brors, "Nato expanderar osterut", Smalandstidningen December 11, 1996, sec. World News 
69 Mats Svegfors, "Mera spanskt i Nato", Svenska Dagbladet November 16, 1996, sec. Editorial, p. 2. 
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"Europeanised" so that they can be used by the European Union or WEU. The fourth and 
last car in the train will be readied for Russia if the country changes its mind, and wants 
to join the train. This is what the situation looks like today. NATO has changed 
substantially, but more is to come. The expansion of NATO will be the most important 
change, and the issue will continue to stir up emotions for a number of years to come. 
Before turning to the changing military structures, it merits mention that NATO's 
civilian structure has changed somewhat as well. The North Atlantic Council has 
established a number of committees and groups since January, 1994, in order to manage 
the new tasks. The Political-Military Steering Committee on Partnership for Peace 
(PMSC) is one of them. It works as the principal working forum for PFP. The Joint 
Committee on Proliferation (JCP) is another new committee that consolidates the work of 
two other groups, the Senior Politico-Military Group on Proliferation (SGP) and the 
Senior Defence Group on Proliferation. The SGP's task is to develop an overall policy 
framework on proliferation and serves as a forum for consultations on the political 
aspects of the issue. DGP does the same thing except that it deals with the military 
aspects of proliferation. In May 1994, the NAC also created the Provisional Policy 
Coordination Group (PPCG). In conjunction with NATO's Military Authorities, PPCG 
shall assist the NAC in examining how NATO's political and military structures and 
procedures shall be developed and adapted to work more efficiently and flexibly. The 
group will do the same thing when it comes to NATO's peacekeeping missions and the 
cooperation with the WEU, where the development of the Combined Joint Task Forces is 
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one part.70 
III. Changing Military Structures 
NATO's answer to the new security environment was not limited to NATO's 
enhanced political role, which first resulted in NACC and later in PFP. The other major 
development was to review its military structure. Since the Alliance was established, 
NATO has mainly been a military defence alliance. During the Cold War, NATO's 
strategy was mostly of defensive nature: 
It involved a 'layer cake' defence in depth and a commitment to defend the forward edge of the 
Alliance area. The intention was to defend all areas of the Alliance simultaneously, to deploy a 
forward presence and a significant reinforcement capability was required.71 
The new strategy is part of NATO's new Strategic Concept, which replaced the old 
strategy. It concentrates less on balance and threat, but more on the task of developing 
and maintaining stability.72 Because of the changing security, NATO was given the task 
of providing the forces and capabilities needed to deal with crisis management and crisis 
prevention operations, including peacekeeping, while keeping the old goals of defending 
security and territorial integrity of NATO's members.73 A consequence of the fact that the 
military threat from the East had declined substantially, and the fact that NATO's political 
role was stressed, was that there was a political wish in member states to reduce NATO's 
military resources. Instead of a counting on large numbers of forces, "enhanced flexibility 
and mobility" would become the new concept.74 NATO's military headquarters (SHAPE) 
70 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1995, pp. 99-100. 
71 Latter, 1995, p. 14. 
72 Ibid. 
73 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1995, p. 163. 
74 Christopher Conliffe, "The Alliance Transformed: A Sceptical View", in David G. Haglund, S. Neil 
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presented a proposal for the new force structure during 1990. The new structure 
emphasizes mobility, flexibility and the need to continue the process of modernizing 
NATO's forces . The proposal suggested three types of forces in the new structure: 
Covering Forces, Main Defence Forces, and Reaction Forces. The Covering Forces would 
have the task of identifying and delaying aggression.75 The Main Defence Forces consist 
of armoured and mechanized divisions, and they are ready to stop, and annihilate enemy 
forces should they break through the Cover Forces. The Reaction Forces have two 
purposes: either they can be used to handle crises that need a quick response, or they will 
serve as reinforcements. The Reaction Forces were divided into two forces: Immediate 
Reaction Forces and Rapid Reaction Forces. The former forces would be created from 
existing units such as the Allied Command Europe (ACE) Mobile Force, and naval units 
stationed in the Atlantic and in the Mediterranean. The Rapid Reaction Forces, of which 
the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps is the land component, would be 
multinational, and be the symbol of NATO's new role in Europe and of its capability to 
leave the Cold War behind. It would at the same time give NATO an instrument that the 
Alliance could use to meet the new kind of challenges and threats. It was decided that the 
new force will be led by the British, and comprise eight or ten divisions, some of which 
are planned to be multinational. They will be of different size and different content, so 
that NATO could chose the best units depending on what kind of situation the Alliance 
MacFarlane, and Joel J. Sokolsky (eds.) NATO's Eastern Dilemmas, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc. , 
1994), p. 31. 
75 NATO later changed the name and the purpose of the Cover Forces into Augmentation Forces which will 
serve as a strategic reserve. 
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would have to deal with.76 
At the Brussels Summit in January 1994, it was decided that NATO's adaptation 
of its military structures and procedures would continue. It was important that NATO 
would be able to conduct its missions efficiently and flexibly. It was also decided that the 
European pillar of the Alliance would be strengthened by: 
... facilitating the use of NATO's military capabilities for NATO and European/WED operations; 
and assisting the participation of non-NATO partners in joint peacekeeping operations and other 
contingencies as envisaged under the Partnership for Peace.77 
Part of the adaptation was extensive force reductions. There was a 25 per cent reduction 
in the total number of NATO ground combat units and NATO's peacetime strength, when 
it comes to land forces in the Central Region78 , was reduced by more than 45 per cent. 
The number of naval vessels assigned to NATO was reduced by 10 percent. NATO air 
forces were also reduced. There was a 25 per cent decrease in the total number of combat 
aircraft assigned to NATO and a 45 percent reduction of the air forces in the Central and 
Northern Regions. The air forces corning from North America were cut back by 25 
percent as well. Since then, the Alliance has further reviewed its forces deployed in 
Europe.79 
The reductions of resources mentioned above also include the nuclear part of 
NATO's defence forces . Nuclear weapons are now officially seen as political tools, even 
more so than earlier, and there have been significant reductions in the deployment of 
76 Mcinnes, 1995, pp. 87-109. ; See also North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1995, for an in-depth 
description of NATO's new military structure. 
77 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1995, p. 164. 
78 The Central Region is basically Germany. A Soviet conventional attack was always expected to come 
through Germany which explains why large concentrations of troops were stationed in Germany. 
79 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1995, pp. 164-165. 
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nuclear weapons on the European mainland.80 There is a new arms reduction initiative, 
the START ill, that will, if it is negotiated and ratified, reduce the number of nuclear 
warheads in Russia and in the United States to 2,000 each by the year 2007.81 
When NATO decided to help the UN in Yugoslavia in 1992, the structure had to 
change to adapt to the new task. NATO was looking for a way to make it possible for 
non-members of the Alliance to participate in NATO-led operations. In 1994 the answer 
to the problem was found. The solution was called Combined Joint Task Forces. Any 
challenge will be met by the "provision of separable but not separate military 
structures ... "82 The CJTF is designed to respond in a flexible way to new challenges, and 
to strengthen the European pillar of NATO through cooperation with the WEU. Whether 
WEU or NATO is leading a future operation, it enables non-members such as PFP 
participants to take part in any operations. 83 
As a response to the changing policies and the changing security environment, 
NATO has also made following changes to its military structure, which are only 
examples: A Military Cooperation Working Group (MCWG) has been established to 
coordinate cooperation activities undertaken under the authority of the NATO military 
authorities. To help the implementation of the Combined Joint Task Forces, a Military 
Transitional Issues Working Group (MTIWG) was established to provide a forum for the 
Military Committee. Finally, an Ad Hoc Planning Coordination Group (AHPCG) was 
created to address the coordination of peacekeeping operations and crisis management 
80 Latter, 1995, p. 15. 
81 Henriksson, March 22, 1997, p. 6. 
82 US Department of Defense, 1995, p. 8. 
83 Ibid., p. 9. 
91 
between NATO and non-members.84 
IV. Conclusion 
These changes presented above are the most important so far in NATO's quest to 
adapt to the new reality. The goal of this chapter was to outline the most important 
changes within NATO during the 1990s. The changes were divided into two parts. The 
first addressed the new way of thinking, and the second addressed the new structure of 
NATO. One of the most important decisions was that of the planned expansion of the 
Alliance. By including countries in Eastern Europe, NATO has improved its chances to 
survive in the long run, and perhaps more importantly, improved the chances of a long-
lasting peace in Europe. In what way are the changes described above, explained by 
politicians and academics? Are they enough? Scholars, among them Colin Mcinnes, see 
them as enough to guarantee NATO a short-term future, but when it comes to NATO's 
long-term future they become more uncertain. As Mcinnes says: "A political role may be 
sufficient to ensure the Alliance's survival, but not its centrality".85 This question will be 
brought up in Chapter Five which concludes this thesis. It is now time to turn to Chapter 
Four where the changes outlined above are studied and explained using the theoretical 
framework presented in the Introduction Chapter. 
84 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1995, pp. 152-153. 
85 Mcinnes, 1995, p. 107. 
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I. Introduction 
Chapter 4 
Explaining the Changes 
In previous chapters, the background of the Alliance has been presented, NATO's 
continued existence has been discussed, and in last chapter the most important changes 
since the collapse of the communist systems in Eastern Europe were discussed. In this 
chapter the question of why these changes took place will be addressed. In the process of 
evolving, NATO had different options. If we can understand, or even begin to understand, 
why certain changes took place, then we have gained a greater knowledge of how things 
work in the fields of organizational theory and international relations. This will enable us 
to go on to a much more difficult task -- that of predicting what is going to happen in the 
future and what changes will take place. The structure of this chapter is the same as in the 
previous chapter. First, comes a section explaining the new way of thinking within 
NATO, and then a section dealing with NATO' s new structure follows . The theoretical 
framework will be used again in this chapter. 
II. Explaining the New Way of Thinking 
After a short period of inertia, a review process for NATO began in 1990. The 
foreign ministers of the member countries met and discussed the future of the Alliance. 
There was unanimous consent that NATO still could perform important tasks to maintain 
stability in Europe and enhance security. The foreign ministers agreed that the original 
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main goal was still important, but not enough. The defence alliance needed to adapt: 
Although the prevention of war will always remain our fundamental task, the changing European 
environment now requires of us a broader approach to security based as much on constructive 
peace-building as on peace-keeping. 1 
The foundation for any adaptations was the success NATO had with coordination, 
political consultations and other forms of intra-Alliance cooperation that had taken place 
in the past. 
The former Secretary General, Manfred Womer described NATO as "the midwife 
of change", which had the opportunity to influence a historic process. He also stated, in 
connection with his three suggested roles for NATO described in Chapter Three, that by 
using the Alliance as a political tool, NATO could help "to form a security structure 
favorable to political change on which you could build forms of an undivided Europe"? 
One of the fundamental decisions which has had major implications for all 
changes that have taken place within NATO was that of involving the Alliance's former 
adversaries in the process of extending security. At the London Summit in July 1990, the 
Heads of State invited the Warsaw Pact members to establish diplomatic liaisons with 
NATO. CSCE was given an enhanced role to deal with broader political topics in Europe. 
It was suggested in the London Declaration that CSCE should be institutionalised "to 
provide regular consultation between member-states", and that a series of CSCE review 
conferences should be held? 
The "Partnership with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe" began to take 
1 Fergus Carr and Kostas Ifantis, NATO in the New European Order (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc. , 
1996), p. 63 . 
2 S. Nelson Drew, Keith W. Dayton, William J. Erwin, M. Barry Keck, Philip C. Marcum (eds.) The Future 
of NATO (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1991), p. 52. 
3 Carr and Ifantis, 1996, p. 63. 
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its form in June 1991. It was a document that stated that NATO did not want to isolate 
any country, and that it was important that a new division of the continent would not 
evolve. So far, it had only been words, but during 1991 words became actions and turned 
into more solid plans. The plans for NATO were interrupted at the beginning of 1991 
when the events in the Persian Gulf led to war. The war, which ended successfully for the 
Western-led coalition, showed what an effective war-machine the West had.4 1t is highly 
probable that the turn out of the war strengthened NATO's legitimacy as the only real 
defence organization able to protect the interests of the West. The war strengthened the 
view of neorealists that the world is full of potential conflicts, and that NATO is still very 
much needed. 
As stated earlier, the decision to approach the former communist countries set the 
agenda for the events that followed. A large part of the explanation for the "new way of 
thinking", which was dealt with in last chapter, can be found in the survival debate 
between the two schools in Chapter Two. External events had changed the conditions that 
NATO was working under. The debate following the legitimacy challenge created in 
itself a basis for the new way of thinking. A new way of thinking was as natural as it was 
necessary. NATO's legitimacy debate was bound to result in an array of different 
suggestions for the future. The most potent ideas amalgamated into a framework where 
NATO could adapt and evolve. 
The new way of looking at security was clearly part of this. The sudden 
acceptance of a broader interpretation of security can be explained by looking at the 
4 J. Werner Feld, The Future of European Security and Defense Policy (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 1993), pp. 8-9. 
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transition period from two angles.5 First, it was easier to legitimise NATO's continued 
existence if security meant more than military security. The inherent military threat for 
which traditional security was needed has declined. By broadening the concept of 
security, more multi-faced threats to security could be used as justifications for 
maintaining NATO. Neorealists on one hand still maintain that there is a military threat, 
but they do not disregard the "new" threats on the other. These threats just add to the 
justification that NATO is needed against the military threat. To neoliberal 
institutionalists the use of the broader concept of security is a natural part of the new way 
of thinking. The new way of looking at things is based on the opportunities for 
cooperation and reform that arose because of the political turbulence in eastern and 
central Europe. 
The second way of dealing with this is to disregard NATO and the attempts to 
justify its future and to admit that there were certain factors that made it logical to 
broaden the concept of security. The disintegration of the former Soviet Union, and the 
dissolution of WTO and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) created a 
number of new and old states in which there exist dire social, economic and political 
problems.6 Each one of these "new" problems is enough to cause instability within their 
borders as well as outside the borders of these countries. Problems, which existed during 
the communist era such as minority groups and crime, were earlier kept under the surface 
by the harsh communist system. Now, when they have surfaced they may be considered 
5 Most neorealists argue that security has more than one dimension. Bjorn Hettne, Internationella Relationer 
(Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1992), pp. 18-19. 
6 The old and worn out industry in Central and Eastern Europe nearly collapsed in the aftermath of the 
political upheavals in 1989-1990 in the attempts to create free market economies. This resulted in extremely 
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to pose a threat to security. Migration has also become part of the security debate. It poses 
a threat to security, at least in theory. Western Europe must not only fear migration from 
the East, but also from the South according to some. Whatever one chooses to link to the 
concept of security, the point is that NATO's leadership has realized that "security 
arrangements are untenable without political, economic and social concomitants".7 The 
result of this new way of looking at security was NATO's new Strategic Concept 
presented at the Summit in Rome, November 1991. 
Out of this realisation came the decision to enhance NATO's political role and to 
open up a dialogue with the East European countries at the same time as NATO would 
continue to provide its members with security understood in the traditional way. This 
pleased both neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists. NATO and the West took a self-
confident stance. Cooperation, dialogue, and affiliation with the Western Democracies 
were thought to spread stability. There was also the idea that the eastern European 
countries had a lot to learn from the West. The advantage with the plan to increase 
cooperation on multiple levels, according to neoliberalists, was that NATO could use its 
own institutions and the experience gathered for more than forty years in its work. 
The idea that the former communist countries should be brought closer to the 
West opened another issue. If NATO could stretch its arms into former enemy countries, 
why could not NATO extend its area of interest to other areas as well? If NATO was to 
become a tool of stability making, it was logical to look at other areas in NATO's vicinity 
where political unrest is present as well. The result of that kind of thinking can among 
high unemployment in these countries and a lower living standard for the populations. 
7 Jerold D. Green; F. Stephen Larrabee; Ian 0. Lesser, "NATO is Looking South, and Mideast Peace Stands 
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other examples be seen in the dialogue that NATO is having with Mauritania, Morocco, 
Tunisia, Egypt, Israel, and Jordan.8 Having overcome the initial angst, NATO seemed to 
stress the fact that it had successfully survived the Cold War, and that no other institution 
could measure up to its standards. 
The wish to extend security and to cooperate closely is the core of the new way of 
thinking. It was out of the wish for closer cooperation with the former Warsaw Pact 
countries that the North Atlantic Cooperation Council grew. The goal was a "shared 
security culture based upon cooperation, mutual consideration and restraint, openness and 
shared responsibilities". 9 Established in December, 1991, this sub-organization to NATO 
commenced its work of getting the East and the West to start cooperating. In search for 
closer relations with the East and Central European countries, NACC became a 
framework for "dismantling the remnants of the confrontation of the cold war, both the 
physical and the mental relics". 10 NACC has accomplished the task of getting most of the 
new republics and the former communist countries to join NACC. One consequence of 
the talks has been an economic restructuring in the East. However, this has proven to be 
very difficult because of the state of most of the economies in those countries. It seems as 
if the "Iron Curtain" has been replaced with a "Poverty Curtain". 11 
NACC turned out to be a good beginning, but the frustration increased both in the 
West and in the East when governments wanted to deepen the cooperation. Former US 
to Gain," International Herald Tribune January 18, 1995. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Johan Jorgen Holst, A Changing NATO in a Changing Europe (Oslo: The Norwegian Atlantic Committee, 
1992), p. 12. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Gunilla Herolf, "NATO och VEU- vilka roller spelar de?" Sarnhallsmagasinet EPOK 1995, pp. 17-18. 
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Secretary of State, Warren Cristopher, called NACC a "paper relationship". 12 This 
frustration laid the foundation for the Partnership for Peace-programme, which will be 
dealt with later in this chapter. 
The growing number of inter-state conflicts and ethnic conflicts after the end of 
the Cold War resulted in an increased demand for peacekeeping operations by the UN. 
Between 1988 and 1992 the number ofUN-led peacekeeping operations was greater than 
the total number of operations carried out during the entire Cold War. The UN has also 
shown a new activeness after the success with the war in the Persian Gulf. 13 Since most 
of the influential countries in the UN also are members of NATO, it was natural for most 
neoliberal institutionalists that NATO would be influenced by the new assertiveness of 
the UN since international institutions influence states and the behaviour of states. 14 This 
assertiveness together with the fact that NATO was looking for a new identity at the time 
were important reasons for NATO's decision to become the tool of the UN and the CSCE. 
This was especially true since the conflict in former Yugoslavia showed tendencies to 
grow worse, and the conflict area was clearly in NATO's neighbourhood. NATO's new 
Strategic Concept talked about the need to adopt preventive diplomacy and crisis 
management, so it did not come as a surprise when the North Atlantic Council declared in 
June 1992, that NATO was ready to support peacekeeping operations on a case-by-case 
basis under the CSCE. A few months later, in December, this offer was extended to 
12 Ted Galen Carpenter, Beyond NATO: Staying Out of Europe 's Wars (Washington D.C.: The Cato 
Institute, 1994), p. 25 . 
13 Carr and Ifantis, 1996, p. 110. 
14 Alfred van Staden, "A Lasting Alliance? On the Creation, Evolution, and Future of NATO", Acta Politica 
vol. 30, no. 3., 1995 (July), p. 299. 
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operations under the supervision of the UN. 15 By this move, NATO had added a new 
goal, and reestablished legitimacy to the organization, at the same time as the defence 
alliance attempted to extend stability and security in the region. As with the example of 
the International Red Cross in the Introduction Chapter, NATO solidified its legitimacy 
by adding new tasks. It is important that the organization is perceived to have tasks that 
are seen as achievable and important to the members. The timing was very good. The 
willingness of the UN to take on more peacekeeping operations had to be supplemented 
by a tool that could take on the tasks. Again, NATO had the experience, the structure and 
the means to perform exactly those tasks that the UN was looking for. This new task of 
peacekeeping was linked with the task of increasing cooperation with NATO and the rest 
of the European countries. NATO sought cooperation with NACC when developing plans 
for peacekeeping operations, and received support from NACC in December 1992 when 
NACC promised to share expertise and cooperate in planning operations. 16 
The limits of NACC became obvious when the members wanted to go beyond the 
dialogue stage which was underway in order to deepen relations. When NACC was 
established there were high hopes among some of the Central European countries that it 
would be a waiting room for countries which wanted to join NATO. This was especially 
true in former Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary which all hoped that NATO's 
member states would consider them ready to become members of the defence alliance. 17 
In these countries, and in other former Warsaw Pact countries, Russia is seen as a military 
15 Carr and Ifantis, 1996, p. 120. 
16 Ibid. , p. 121. 
17 Mats Carlbom, "Natos framtid blir ett niitverk av allianser," Dagens Nyheter November 20, 1993, sec. 
World News, p. A 13. 
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threat, and a threat to their new independence. A membership in NATO is seen as a 
protection against the Russians. 18 Russia's initial interest in seeing its former satellites 
getting closer to NATO was soon replaced by a hard-core resistance. In a letter to the 
governments of NATO, President Yeltsin stated that he firmly opposed any attempts to 
enlarge NATO. NATO and Russia should guarantee the security of the Central European 
countries together. 19 
With NACC, which was not enough to satisfy the needs of some of the newly 
democratic states, it was clear that NATO had a problem. On one hand, security would be 
extended and cooperation increased if new members were allowed to join, but the risk of 
having a defensive, and assertive Russia on the other hand, was far from what NATO 
wanted to have. There was a risk that the situation would become more insecure with 
more members. Yet, it was impossible to ignore the fact that there was a strong security 
need among most of the Central European states as well as many of the former Soviet 
Republics. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were all occupied by the Soviet Union after 
World War IT, and they have been among the countries which have been the most eager to 
approach the Western community. They see NATO as the only alternative when it comes 
to achieve military security.20 Many of the countries interested in a NATO-membership 
have also approached the European Union. One can argue that neorealists have been the 
most positive to an enlargement. They understand the feeling of insecurity that exists in 
many former communist countries, while neoliberal institutionalists fear increased 
tension between NATO and Russia. They want to cooperate as much as possible with the 
18 Herolf, 1995, p. 18. 
19 Carlbom, 1993, p. 13. 
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Russians to enhance security. Neorealists see this as futile as it is only a matter of time 
before Russia becomes aggressive again. 
The solution to this security need, at least on a short-term basis, was the 
Partnership for Peace programme which former US minister of defence, Les Aspin, 
presented in October, 1993. This programme meant that countries outside NATO could 
cooperate to a degree that they decided themselves. It gave the former communist 
countries a chance to get familiar with NATO's military routines and structures. PFP's 
fifth goal, stated in Chapter Three, is "to develop ... forces that are better able to operate 
with those of the members of the North Atlantic Alliance" .Z1 
By establishing PFP, NATO gained some time. PFP would not give any of the full 
range security guarantees that would accompany a full membership in NATO, but it was a 
step on the way for those who coveted a membership. However, there were still neoliberal 
institutionalists who believed in NACC as the best way of slowly increasing cooperation 
without upsetting Russia, and thus increase tension. For them, PFP represented a 
weakening of NACC and its goals.22 
Nevertheless, those wishing to become NATO-members did not give up these 
efforts after joining the Partnership-programme, and NATO's internal discussion 
regarding an enlargement did not stop. On the contrary, it seems as if PFP triggered the 
process which led to NATO's decision to expand. NATO's members viewed PFP 
differently. One of the explanations why enlargement slowly became accepted might have 
20 Hakan Hagwall, "Nato fick lite fart pa Nordiska radet," Svenska Dagbladet November 13, 1996, p. 2. 
21 Richard Latter, NATO in the New Europe (London: Wiston House Conference Centre, 1995), Wilton 
Park Paper no. 99., p. 12. 
22 Uwe Nerlich, "Die NATO als KernstUck einer europaischen Sicherheitsstruktur," Europa-Archiv 
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been that the United States took an early view that expanding the Alliance was a positive 
thing, and that PFP should be seen as a waiting room: 
For some, PFP will be an essential tool in the demanding task of preparing themselves to meet 
the responsibilities of full NATO membership. PFP also provides a valuable framework for 
evaluating the ability of each partner to assume the obligations and commitments of NATO 
membership - a testing ground for their capabilities? 3 
Why is it that NATO has proceeded with this plan to expand when Russia has 
opposed this so vehemently? It might be that enlargement serves two important purposes. 
First, extending stability and security in Europe will benefit the countries in NATO both 
economically, and when it comes to security. Second, it is a way of making the victory of 
the Cold War final. It is a rather cynical, but the fact is that the geographical and strategic 
map would look different should a Cold War situation ever occur again, something that 
neorealists see as a clear possibility. This is not as bold as it sounds. This is exactly what 
some Russians fear or suspect. At the beginning of 1997, Russian Minister of Defence, 
Igor Rodionov, stated that an enlargement of NATO might constitute a military threat 
against Russia. A group of high-ranking officers have also, in an open letter to President 
Y eltsin, suggested that Russia should target its intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) 
at the West European capitals again.24 These are not scattered comments or statements. 
There seem to be those in Russia who use the enlargement politically to scare people, but 
there is also a deep feeling that it would be a severe blow to Russia's pride, a sign of lost 
importance, and of lost influence. Ambassador Julij Kvitsinskij belongs to the 
conservative forces in Russian politics, and he is also counselor to the speaker in the 
vol. 49, no.17 (September 10, 1994), p. 505 . 
23 US Department of Defense, United States Security Strategy for Europe and NATO (Washington D.C.: 
Department of Defense, Office of International Security Affairs, June 1995), p. 12. 
24 TI-AFP, "Frostiga samtal om utvidgning av Nato," Smalandstidningen January 21, 1997, sec. World 
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Duma. He is one of the people neorealists point at when they argue that Russia is bound 
to regain its former aggressive posture. At a conference in Sweden in January 1997, 
K vitsinskij had following to say: 
NATO's enlargement is in reality an attempt to prepare a military attack on Russia. But one day 
Russia will escape from the trap, and you can be sure of that, as sure as you can be that night 
follows day. Russia will be reborn and show gratitude towards her friends, but teach her 
opponents what justice is.25 
NATO probably feels that now is the right time to expand. Russia is too weak to pose a 
real threat to any expansion plans. The goal is to try to convince Russia that letting other 
countries join NATO does not pose a threat other than to its ego. NATO does not want to 
humiliate Russia. Lech Walesa, the former President of Poland, describes NATO's 
expansion plans as a peaceful process.26 
At the "Summit for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation and Security" in Madrid, July 8-9 
1997, NATO's future was shaped and defined. It was not only NATO's future that was 
outlined. In some regards, the decisions made at the conference will shape Europe for the 
21st century, and it is the final proof of the new way of thinking. This is what NATO 
achieved at the Madrid Summit: 
1) NATO invited the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary to begin accession 
negotiations with the defence alliance. The Alliance's goal is to be able to 
welcome new members in 1999. The three Baltic states, Romania and Slovenia 
are next in line. 
2) NATO will launch an enhanced Partnership for Peace initiative to widen the scope 
of cooperation with the partners, particularly in political consultations and 
News. 
25 Mikael Holmstrom, "Nato beskylls fi:ir anfallsplaner," Svenska Dagbladet January 29, 1997, sec. 
Domestic News: 9. (This is quote is translated from Swedish. Some minor nuances might have been lost in 
the translation. [the author]). 
26 Lech Walesa, "Wary of a Weakened Russia, Walesa Urges NATO Expansion," The Globe and Mail 
March 14, 1997, sec. International News, p. A 10. 
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operational planning and activities. 
3) NATO will further develop an enhanced relationship with Ukraine 
4) NATO aims to reach an agreement with Russia which would ensure a strong, 
stable, and enduring security partnership. It has been decided to establish a special 
NATO-Russia council where Russia can have a say but no right to veto. 
5) NATO will put the finishing touches on a reformed command structure to 
improve the capability to carry out NATO's new mission of crisis management, to 
enable all Allies to participate fully in the structure and to contribute to the 
building of the European Security and Defence Identity. This will be done through 
regional commands. 
6) The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, which is a new institution instigated by 
NATO, met for the first time in Madrid. The intention is to give Europe's 28 non-
members of NATO a greater chance to influence politically.Z7 
III. Explaining the New Military Structure 
NATO realised after the communist empire had begun to crumble that there was 
no longer a need to pursue annual real increases in defence expenditures. The 
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty and the prospects of an improved security 
situation in Europe decreased the necessity to keep large numbers of troops at alert. 28 It 
was clear that the "old" NATO equipped to prevent a conventional attack by the Warsaw 
Pact, and deter a nuclear attack, would not be much of a use in the rapidly changing 
security environment. Military structures are designed to implement NATO strategy in an 
efficient way. These structures had to change dramatically if they were going to meet the 
new demands of the 1990s. The new strategic concept that was developed in the 
aftermath of the Cold War tried to do exactly that. Conventional and nuclear balance 
27 See Javier Solana, "Shaping NATO for the 21 51 Century", NATO Review vol. 45, no. 1, 1997, p. 3.; See 
also Mikael Holmstrom, "Skugga over historisk dag for Nato", Svenska Dagbladet July 8, 1997, p. 6. 
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became less important because the Soviet Union did not pose the same threat as it used to 
do. The former Warsaw Pact members competed with each other in their attempts to 
approach the West. The urge to reach a military, strategic balance was replaced by the 
task of trying to achieve and maintain stability in Central and Eastern Europe.Z9 Crisis 
management was added to the goals of the Alliance. The chance of regional crises 
breaking out seemed to increase with ethnic conflicts in many of the new republics and 
with the crisis in former Yugoslavia as a constant reminder. 
The new situation with a diminished threat-perception explains the reduction in 
resources, and the fact that NATO was able to make savings of 25 percent.30 The new 
goals that NATO had taken on and the new situation mentioned above made it necessary 
to change the force structure as was described in Chapter Three. Mobility, flexibility and 
multinationality were all results from the decreased threat. With mobile and flexible 
forces it was not necessary to maintain the same numbers as earlier which meant that 
defence cuts could be introduced. These defence cuts had a positive effect for NATO in 
that it helped increasing the legitimacy of the organization among the public in the 
member states where huge defence budgets have been problematic for politicians to 
defend. 
One explanation for creating multinational forces is that it would relieve NATO 
from having the historical heritage of "occupational forces" in other member countries.31 
It was also done to prevent a future challenge from WEU, which has experimented with, 
28 Carr and Ifantis, 1996, p. 62. 
29 9 Latter, 19 5, p. 14. 
30 Ibid. , p. 15. 
31 Feld, 1993, p. 9. 
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for example, French and German troops training and working together. 
When NATO's Strategic Concept was extended in 1992, NATO was charged with 
the task of crisis management outside the Alliance area. The structure was not prepared 
for peacekeeping operations and modifications were necessary to accommodate this: 
The required Command and Control structures for peacekeeping on a large scale outside the 
Treaty area simply did not exist. The response was therefore ad hoc, using structures set up for 
in-area operations? 2 
The need to create such structures explains NATO's response of establishing the 
Combined Joint Task Forces. Flexibility was again the key word. CJTFs could easily be 
set up, and non-NATO members could take part in the operations without disturbing 
NATO's other tasks. The CJTF solution also met the demand of being rather cheap. 
NATO's decision to keep nuclear weapons in its arsenal is explained by the fact 
that they unfortunately cannot be disinvented. The NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) 
concluded that: 
for the foreseeable future, the deterrence of war will continue to require the maintenance of 
strategic nuclear forces and widespread Alliance participation in an appropriate mix of survivable 
and nuclear forces in Europe.33 
Even though nuclear forces continue to be part of NATO's weaponry, nuclear weapons 
do not have the same importance as during the Cold War. As stated in Chapter Three, 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are now more of a political nature than military, 
and the numbers have been reduced. It might be as much an economic question as it is a 
question of decreased tension in Europe, but nobody had expected the nuclear weapons to 
be abolished after the Cold War. 
The explanations regarding NATO's military re-structuring that neorealists and 
32 Latter, 1995, p. 15 . 
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neoliberal institutionalists use are almost the same. Both argue that changes were 
necessary and that the changes that took place were natural in the adaptation process. The 
difference is again that they stress different motives for the changes. Neorealists tend to 
argue that the changes were made to better meet the new threats that have surfaced, while 
neoliberal institutionalists argue that it was necessary to restructure NATO's military 
parts so that it would be easier to integrate other countries and in order to fulfil the new 
tasks of which peacekeeping is one of the most important ones. 
IV. Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was to explain NATO's second stage and the changes 
that were described in Chapter Three using the theoretical framework. One can argue that 
it to a large extent is the era of neoliberal institutionalists. There is a widely spread 
optimism at the moment in Europe that security can be increased, and that NATO by 
enlarging is doing this. Proponents of this school would argue that the new way of 
thinking, and the institutional changes that we have seen within NATO, is a sign of a 
flexible institution that is adapting. It is adapting in order to use the opportunity to 
enhance security in Europe by increasing integration and cooperation between the East 
and the West. The new way of thinking does not mean that "old" ways of thinking will 
die out entirely. As with most things in society they live side by side. Neorealists stress 
the growing number of inter-state and ethnic conflicts that have surfaced. In addition to 
keeping NATO in case of a Russian return to an aggressive stance, they also see the 
33 Carr and Ifantis, 1996, p. 63 . 
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changes as a response to the new threats. They do not see the opportunities the same way 
as neoliberal institutionalists do. 
Changes will continue to occur, and many of the explanations presented in this 
chapter will look differently in the light of history. That might not lie too far in the future, 
since we have entered an eventful decade. It is now time to turn to the concluding chapter 
where conclusions will be presented and where the study is discussed. 
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I. Introduction 
Chapter Five 
Conclusion 
NATO has entered a new phase after the decision was made to keep the Alliance. 
Several events and changes have occurred during the time that has passed after the end of 
the Cold War, many of which have had huge impact on the work and structure of NATO. 
This chapter includes a summary of the thesis, and it will address the conclusions drawn 
from the study, which includes an evaluation of the theoretical framework that has been 
used. This is followed by a section dealing with the significance of the thesis and also 
future areas of research. Finally, there is a concluding discussion by the author that gives 
his personal view regarding what happened to NATO and the future of the Alliance. 
II. Summary of the Thesis 
This thesis has established that there was a legitimacy challenge directed towards 
NATO when the perceived threat from the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact decreased 
due to the internal, political upheavals that took place in Eastern Europe. The overall 
question that was asked in this thesis was: what was NATO's actual response to the 
legitimacy challenge? The author has studied two stages of the response. The first stage 
constitutes the survival-debate that took place not long after NATO's legitimacy was being 
questioned. Since NATO's survival is a fact, the thesis concentrated on the justifications 
used to keep the organization. Two major groups could be found taking part in the debate, 
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and they were mainly consisting of politicians and academics. 1 One group used negative, 
external justifications for keeping NATO. These people, the neorealists, argue that there 
are both old threats and new threats that legitimise NATO's continued existence. The other 
group, the neoliberal institutionalists, use both positive, external justifications and internal 
justifications which mainly stress cooperation, and the positive aspects of NATO as an 
international security institution. 
The two schools also give somewhat different explanations to the new way of 
thinking and NATO's new structure that has emerged in the second stage of NATO's 
response. Most of the proponents from the two schools agree that NATO was adapting to 
the new security situation in Europe, but their explanations follow to a large extent their 
justifications given in the first stage. Neoliberals argue that NATO is needed to enhance 
security by extending cooperation eastwards and to maintain peace as a peacekeeper for 
the UN. They explain why NACC, and PFP for example, were created, by pointing at this 
need for NATO. Neorealists also explain the changes looking back at their justifications 
used to maintain NATO. They argue that a disintegrated Soviet Union and a dissolved 
Warsaw Pact pose new and modified threats to the West that demand a new kind of 
military defence. It explains NATO's focus on mobility and flexibility in the Alliance's 
new military structure they say, while neoliberals argue that the new structure saves money 
and is necessary if NATO shall work as a peacekeeper where there are other demands on 
the military structure. The conclusions drawn from the study are explained in next section. 
1 It is the author that has labeled the people taking part in the debate. They themselves might not agree with the 
labelling. It is also broad generalizations. 
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III. Conclusions Drawn from the Study 
There are some conclusions that are drawn from the study. The first one concerns stage one 
in NATO's response that deals with the debate and the question why politicians and 
academics want to keep NATO. No matter which school these people belong to, it is clear 
that they agree on at least one thing: NATO is the best solution to their worries or their 
hopes. The qualities of the organization, its experience, its means, its close cooperation, its 
structure and its legitimacy in the eyes of its member states, all these aspects helped both 
neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists make up their minds. That is why they do not 
argue with each other when it comes to the most important conclusion that both schools 
draw: NATO is needed! 
There has not been major disagreement when it comes to stage two either. The 
question of how NATO has adapted is, apart from the different explanations given by the 
two schools, not very contested. It seems as if most neorealists and neoliberal 
institutionalists agree that the changes conducted were the right ones. The conclusion for 
stage two of NATO's response is that NATO now has what it takes to please both those 
who fear future conflicts and those who believe in enhanced security through cooperation 
and integration. 
Despite the agreement, the two schools do not see eye to eye on all things. As we 
might have expected, there are advantages and disadvantages by using either of the two 
schools presented in this thesis. The neorealist school has the advantage of having history 
on its side. History has shown that the world is full of conflicts and that states may have to 
pay dearly if they begin to relax too much. Neorealists are often described as suspicious 
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and negative in their thinking, but there are many events in the past that justify that 
suspicion. On the other hand, it should be noted that parts of the ideas neorealism is based 
upon are outdated, especially when it comes to NATO. One can not draw the same 
conclusions about the NATO we see today and the NATO that existed during the Cold 
War. As stated earlier, NATO has moved on from being the traditional defence alliance it 
once was. NATO has come to encompass so much more than only the military component, 
which is still seen as the most important task among some members.2 One of the favourite 
terms that realists in general like to use is balance of power. Today, it is mote difficult to 
talk about balance of power when the bipolar world has been replaced by a more 
multipolar world.3 
The neoliberal school is more positive when it stresses the opportunities that have 
emerged after the end of the Cold War. Neoliberal institutionalists are more flexible when 
it comes to actors than neorealists who argue that the state is the main actor. By looking at 
institutions as well, neoliberals have an advantage that neorealists lack. But what it gains 
from seeing the opportunities that have arisen and the importance of institutions, the school 
loses when it sometimes disregards the negative sides that neorealists stress and the fact 
that NATO is based on the cooperation of single states. There is also an idealism that 
sometimes shines through. Idealism is good as long as it does not tum into naivete. The 
two schools do not contradict each other. They just have different ways of looking at the 
world and phenomena that take place, and they stress different things. 
2 Mikael Holmstrom, "Nato enades om utvidgningen" Svenska Dagbladet July 9, 1997, sec. World News, p. 7. 
3 There are, however, different views on how to interpret balance of power. (The author) 
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It is the strong opinion of the author that the arguments of neither school , or neither 
group, is enough if one wants to understand why NATO survived and why NATO evolved 
the way it did. One needs to take all justifications and arguments into consideration before 
it is possible to draw any conclusions, because neither school is wrong. Both ways of 
looking at things are valid and necessary. All reasons brought up in the debate helped 
determine NATO's fate and subsequently also the process wherein NATO evolved. It is 
often argued that the more angles you use when studying an object or topic from, the better 
you will see, and the better you will understand. Bjorn Hettne, is one of them. He argues in 
the introduction to his book, Internationella Relationer, that a one-sided focus on one 
theoretical perspective can explain the world on the surface in a good way, but if this 
results in a systematic misinterpretation at the same time, then we will estrange us from 
reality rather than getting closer.4 It is equally important to use a broad-minded view, 
looking at the response of the Alliance from more than one perspective, when one studies 
NATO. It is not argued here that the members of the two groups/schools are 
fundamentalists. There are people like Colin Mcinnes and JohnS. Duffield that do what is 
suggested here. Duffield, for example, explains NATO's persistance by using arguments 
from both schools, using both internal and external justifications. The most fruitful 
analyses tend to come from people like Duffield. However, this does not mean that one 
cannot stress ideas from other schools, or stress ideas from one specific shool, as long as 
all possible angles have been taken into consideration. Few people other than those 
mentioned have realised the importance of alternative interpretations of the same 
4 Bjorn Hettne, InternationellaRelationer (Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1992), p. 5. 
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phenomenon. The conclusion is thus that all justifications given were valid and contributed 
to NATO's survival and continued evolvement. 
The two stages that were studied show that NATO's response was rather quick and 
at the same time not hasty. The almost unanimous support for maintaining the Alliance 
made the process easier even though the motives for keeping NATO differed. It is also 
noted that the second stage of NATO' s was of a dual nature which helped in the quest of 
overcoming the last doubt about the ability of the organization to adapt. NATO could 
probably have kept the old military structure while still adopting the new way of thinking. 
This would most likely not have worked in the long run. The changes went hand in hand in 
a way that benefited NATO. As a final conclusion it must be argued that NATO's 
evolution, or response, was well-balanced, well-timed and conducted so that both people in 
the West and in the East perceived NATO to be the best security solution for Europe when 
it comes to stability. Without political stability it is nearly impossible to meet the other 
security needs as social and economic security for example. 
IV. Significance and Future Areas of Research 
One of the significant aspects of this thesis is that it looks through both lenses and 
acknowledges the importance of using more than one lens. Without doing this it is 
impossible to predict anything. John W. Burton stated in his book, World Society: 
" ... individual, group or other behaviour cannot be analysed and explained adequately by 
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attention only to one aspect of it, ... It requires all disciplines to explain behaviour in such a 
way as to enable prediction."5 
A second significant aspect of the study is that it analyses a contemporary 
international organization which influences, and is influenced by, many governments when 
it comes to foreign, defence and security policies. This is important because it represents 
an organization that has effectively dealt with the changing concept of security. It is also 
important because we might learn things about other international institutions when it 
comes to enhancing security and cooperation. The UN has been scrutinised the last few 
years and many people want to see reforms. Perhaps, they should look at NATO and its 
response to the legitimacy challenge. There are many differences, but also similarities. It 
could be fruitful future study to compare NATO and the UN when it comes to legitimacy 
and dealing with challenges. A third significance of this thesis is that it gives a face to the 
changes within the oldest defence alliance and also to some of the security needs in Europe 
today. More importantly, these changes have not yet been sufficiently covered in a 
comprehensive way by academics. This thesis is one of few works that studies the whole 
process of an evolving NATO since the political turmoil began in Eastern and Central 
Europe in 1989. There is a limitation in this thesis and that is that it does not bring up other 
theoretical schools to complement the neorealist and the neoliberal institutionalist schools. 
It was the choice of the author to use, what many people argue are, the most important 
theoretical schools today within international relations. 
There are a couple of areas where future research would be fruitful in connection to 
this thesis. As long as NATO exists there will always be a need to study the organization 
5 John W. Burton, World Society (London: Cambridge University Press, 1972), p. 15. 
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and its activities. As this thesis has treated the short-term survival of the defence 
organization, it would be interesting to analyse its future long-term chances to survive in 
Europe, especially if the EU and NATO expand over the next few years. Will there be 
another legitimacy challenge for NATO if Russia becomes a true democracy and decides 
to become a member of the organization? Legitimacy is another field that would be 
interesting to study further. Is legitimacy more or less important for an organization today, 
and does it matter where in the world the organization works? The concept of security is a 
third field where further studies can be made. The definition of security will never be 
static, but the question is if military security will be totally replaced by, for example, 
economic and social aspects, or if we will see a continued development of a broad 
interpretation of security as a concept? A fourth and final field that is always important is 
the security needs of the world, and in this case Europe. Before determining and outlining 
these needs it is very difficult to work effectively towards enhanced security. What are the 
security needs of Europe today? That question has been touched upon in this thesis, but not 
adequately. There are many more questions raised in connection to this thesis. The ones 
mentioned above are but a sample. Now, we come to the final discussion of the author, 
which gives a personal view of aspects addressed in this thesis. 
V. Conclusion and Final Discussion of the Author 
It was a very broad debate concerning NATO that followed the end of the Cold 
War. There is no doubt that NATO's legitimacy had diminished due to the changed threat 
perception and the changing security environment in Europe. It was discovered that there 
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were too many reasons that spoke for a continued existence of NATO to threaten its 
existence. First, NATO has come to provide more than security for its members over the 
years. The consultations and the close military and civilian cooperation, which have 
evolved throughout the decades, have been important to NATO and to western Europe as a 
whole. It is possible that it would have been enough to keep NATO for that reason. The 
chance that the United States would have wanted to keep its strong ties with Western 
Europe is rather strong, even if that would have meant reducing the American financial 
burden in the Alliance. Second, one has to argue that keeping NATO as a defence alliance 
has a preventive purpose. Here, the author agrees with many neorealists. We cannot say for 
sure that Russia has given up the old expansionist ideas of the former Soviet Union, or that 
the new strong Germany will not exert its leadership-power more in the future. The 
sentiments after the World War I come to mind. The euphoria when that war ended can be 
compared for example to the sentiment when the Berlin Wall was tom down on November 
9-10, 1989. That comparison does not mean that we should expect a third world war in a 
couple of years, only that a certain cautiousness should be exercised. However unlikely, or 
remote, the security situation in Europe can change for the worse. 
The changes that took place within NATO came as a response to the new way of 
thinking and to the decision to adapt to a new reality. The North Atlantic Cooperation 
Council and the Partnership for Peace Programme were excellent ideas and a good 
beginning to the extended cooperation with the East and Central European countries. 
NATO's peacekeeping role emerged from the successful outcome of the war in the Persian 
Gulf and from the conflicts in former Yugoslavia. 
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The changes within NATO's military structure were perhaps the most natural and 
the most expected ones. It was impossible both for economic and legitimacy reasons to 
keep the old structures. There was no need for large numbers of troops and huge arsenals 
filled with weapons of mass destruction. In the new era, mobility and flexibility were 
stressed as key factors when the threat of a Soviet mass invasion turned into a threat of 
smaller conflicts that could break out on short notice. 
The most surprising event that has taken place is perhaps NATO's early 
enlargement. Nobody could predict in 1989 that the Warsaw Pact would dissolve and that 
three of its former members would begin negotiating in 1997 for a membership. Many 
people are worried that the process is too quick. It is argued here that it is of outmost 
importance that Russia is as much involved as it can and as much as it is allowed. The 
relationship NATO-Russia is the key to security in Europe today and for a long time to 
come. Closer relations between the West and Russia can only benefit the security situation. 
Therefore, it is important for NATO to be careful and diplomatic when dealing with Russia 
and its former satellites. The West has to realize that the Russians are proud and that they 
have security concerns of their own. This cautiousness should not be brought so far that 
political forces in Russia can use it for short-sighted political gains. An open dialogue on 
all levels would be very much appreciated from a security point of view. 
What lies ahead for NATO then? Predictions are always difficult to make, but the 
Alliance will continue to be the most important security actor in Europe for a very long 
time to come. By the decision to enlarge, NATO has not only assured its continued 
existence, but also given itself new blood. The biggest threat against NATO as an 
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organization is not the legitimacy challenge any more. It may be seen as a contradiction, 
but the improved security situation in Europe threatens the cohesion within NATO that 
was very much based on the external threat of the Soviet Union. Now, when that threat is 
all but gone, the cohesion within NATO is in jeopardy. 6 At the meeting in Madrid, France 
played the enfant terrible by attempting to convince the rest of the members that Romania 
and Slovenia should be accepted as well. Although, it was more of a French attempt to 
exert power, it shows that the Alliance might have future problems agreeing on important 
decisions. 7 
Despite this, it is likely that we will see a second expansion of the Alliance 
beginning in 1999 when the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary have been accepted as 
members. Much can happen in a very short time, but it is difficult to see what Russia has to 
gain from stopping the course of events. It should be totally clear to the Russian political 
leadership that NATO lacks the political willpower, political backing and the ability to 
pose a military threat to Russia. The only way NATO could gather the necessary political 
strength to pose a military threat is if Russia chooses an expansionist path in the future and 
thus becomes a threat to NATO and the new states in East and Central Europe. In that case 
it is more or less self-inflicted. However, this does not prevent Russian politicians from 
using NATO expansion as a tool in domestic politics as a diversion from internal 
problems. The best possible outcome we can hope for is that NATO and Russia on one 
hand and the EU and Russia on the other, increase cooperation on all levels. Increased 
cooperation and integration is so far the best way to enhance security and welfare in the 
6 Mikael Holmstrom, "Skugga over historisk dag for Nato", Svenska Dagbladet July 8, 1997, p. 6. 
7 Mikael Holmstrom, "Ett nytt samarbete skapas i Europa", Svenska Dagbladet July 11 , 1997, sec. World News. 
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region and NATO is a very important tool. Only time will tell if the goal of increased 
security is reached. We have been presented with an excellent opportunity, and so far it 
seems as if NATO uses this opportunity. 
121 
Bibliography 
Abrahamson, Bengt, Varfor finns det organisationer? (Norstedts Forlag AB, 1986). 
Abshire, David M., Burt, Richard R., Woolsey, James, The Atlantic Alliance 
Transformed (Washington D.C. : The Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, August 1992). 
Achilles, Theodore, NATO Review, 1979. 
Andren, Nils, "Thinking About a New European Structure", in (eds.) Armand Clesse and 
Lothar Ruhl, Searching for a New Security Structure for Europe, (Baden-Baden: 
Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1990). 
Asmus, Ronald D., Kugler, Richard L., Larrabee, F. Stephen, "What Will NATO 
Enlargement Cost?", Survival- The IISS Quarterly vol. 38, no. 3 (Autumn, 
1996). 
Betts, Richard K., "NATO's Mid-life Crisis", Foreign Affairs vol. 68, no. 2 (Spring). 
Bluth, Christoph, Kirchner Emil, Sperling, James, The Future of European Security 
(Aldershot, UK: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1995). 
Bluth, Cristoph, "The View from the East", in Cristoph Bluth, Emil Kirchner, James 
Sperling, The Future of European Security (Aldershot, UK: Dartmouth Publishing 
Company, 1995) 
Booth, Ken, (ed.) New Thinking About Strategy and International Security, (London: 
Harper Collins Academic, 1991). 
Borawski, John, "Partnership for Peace and Beyond", International Affairs, vol. 71, 
no. 2, 1995 (April). 
Bruce, Erika v.C., "The Image of the Alliance: Public Opinion Seminar Gauges Support", 
NATO Review vol. 41, no. 6 (December 1993). 
Burton, John W., World Society (London: Cambridge University Press, 1972). 
Buzan, Barry, People, States and Fear (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991). 
Buzan, Barry, "Security, the State. the 'New World Order', and Beyond" in (ed.) Ronnie 
D. Lipschutz, On Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995). 
122 
Carpenter, Ted Galen, Beyond NATO: Staying Out of Europe's Wars (Washington D.C.: 
The Cato Institute, 1994). 
Carr, Fergus, Ifantis, Kostas, NATO in the New European Order (New York: St. Martin's 
Press, Inc., 1996). 
Clesse, Armand, Ruhl, Lothar (eds.), Searching for a New Security Structure in 
Europe (Baden-Baden:Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1990). 
Conliffe, Christopher, "The Alliance Transformed: A Sceptical View", in (eds.) David G. 
Haglund, S. Neil MacFarlane and Joel J. Sokolsky, NATO's Eastern Dilemmas 
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press Inc., 1994). 
Defense News, "West Europeans Push Conversion Plan for Russia", Defense News 
28 February-6 March, 1994. 
Donovan, Kevin F., "The American Response to European Nationalism" in David G. 
Haglund et al. NATO's Eastern Dilemmas (Boulder, CO: Westview Press Inc., 
1994). 
Drew, S. Nelson, Dayton, Keith W., Ervin, William J., Keck, M. Barry, Marcum, 
Philip C. (eds.) The Future of NATO (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1991). 
Duffield, JohnS., "NATO's Functions After the Cold War", Political Science Quarterly, 
vol. 109, no. 5, 1994-1995 (Winter). 
Erazim, Tomas, NATO- en organisation i forandring, minor thesis, (Vaxjo, Sweden: 
Vaxjo University, 1994). 
Etzioni, Amitai, Moderna Organistioner (Stockholm: Aldus/Bonniers, 1973). 
Farm, Daniel, Europeiska Sakerhetsstrukturer - Anpassning till ett nytt konfliktmonster?, 
minor thesis, 1996 (Vaxjo, Sweden: Vaxjo University, 1996). 
Feld, Werner J., The Future of European Security and Defense Policy (Boulder, CO: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993). 
Fricaud-Chagnaud, Charles, "In Search of a New Formulation of the Concept of 
European Security ... " in (eds.) Armand Clesse and Lothar Ruhl, Searching for a 
New Security Structure in Europe Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 
1990). 
Galtung, Johan, Environment, Development and Military Activity (Oslo: 
Universitetsforlaget, 1982). 
123 
Goodby, James E., "Peacekeeping in the New Europe", in (ed.) J. Philip Rogers, The 
Future of European Security (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993). 
Gray, Colin S., "NATO: In Trouble at the Crossroads Again", Strategic Review, vol. 23, 
no. 3, 1995 (Summer). 
Gustafsson, Henrik, NATOs utvidgning Polen Lettland- MeHan Ryssland & Vasteuropa, 
minor thesis, (Vaxjo, Sweden: Vaxjo University, 1996). 
Haglund, David G.; MacFarlane, S. Neil; Sokolsky, Joel J.(eds.), NATO's Eastern 
Dilemmas (Boulder, CO: Westview Press Inc., 1994). 
Haglund, David G.(ed), Will NATO Go East? (Kingston, Ont.: Queen's University, 
1996). 
Haglund, David G., "NATO Expansion: Origins and Evolutions of an Idea" in (ed.) 
David G. Haglund, Will NATO Go East? (Kingston, Ont.: Queen's University, 
1996). 
Hagman, Hans Christian,"Morgondagens NATO- fdigor kring alliansens expansion", 
Internationella Studier, no. 4, 1993. 
Heller, Francis H., Gillingham, John R., NATO: The Founding of the Atlantic Alliance 
and the Integration of Europe (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992). 
Herolf, Gunilla, NATO och det framtida Europa (Stockholm: Utrikespolitiska Institutet, 
January, 1994). 
Herolf, Gunilla, "NATO och VEU- vilka roller spelar de?", Sarnhallsmagasinet EPOK 
(1995). 
Hettne, Bjorn, Internationella relationer (Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1992). 
Holm, Erik, NATO och Warszawapakten (Stockholm: Utrikespolitiska Institutet, 1983). 
Holst, Johan Jorgen, A Changing NATO in a Changing Europe (Oslo: The Norwegian 
Atlantic Committee, 1992). 
Holst, Johan Jorgen, The Future of NATO (Oslo: The Norwegian Atlantic Committee, 
1993). 
Jacobsen, C.G., Miller, M., Spencer, M., Tollefson, E.L., (eds.) World Security- The 
New Challenge (Toronto: Canadian Pugwash Group, 1994). 
124 
Jordan, RobertS., Bloome, Michael W., Political Leadership in NATO: A Study in 
Multinational Diplomacy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979). 
Kamp, Karl-Heinz, "The Folly of Rapid NATO Expansion", Foreign Policy no. 98, 1995 
(Spring). 
Kaiser, Karl, "Reforming NATO", Foreign Policy no. 103, 1996 (Summer). 
Karlsson, Agneta, Om strategi och legitimitet (Lund, Sweden: Lund University Press, 
1991). 
Khan, Rais A., McNiven, James D., An Introduction to Political Science (Scarborough, 
Ont.: Nelson Canada, 4th Edition, 1991). 
Kissinger, Henry A., Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994). 
Kramer, Mark, Smoke, Richard, "Concluding Remarks" in (ed.) Richard Smoke, 
Perceptions of Security (New York: Manchester University Press/St. Martin's 
Press, 1996). 
Latter, Richard, NATO in the New Europe (London: Wiston House Conference Centre, 
1995), Wilton Park Paper no. 99. 
Leffler, Melvyn P., "The Interpretive Wars Over the Cold War, 1945-60" in Gordon 
Martel, American Foreign Relations Reconsidered- 1890-1993 (New York: 
Routledge, 1994). 
Levine, Robert A., Transition and Turmoil in the Atlantic Alliance (New York: Taylor & 
Francis Inc., 1992). 
Lipschutz, Ronnie D.,(ed.) On Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995). 
Lord Ismay, NATO- The First Five Years 1949-1954 (Paris: North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization, 1954). 
Martel, Gordon, American Foreign Relations Reconsidered- 1890-1993 (New York: 
Routledge, 1994). 
Mastny, Vojtech, Russia' s Road to the Cold War (New York, 1979). 
Mcinnes, Colin, "The Future of NATO", in (eds.) Cristoph Bluth, Emil Kirchner, James 
Sperling, The Future of European Security (Aldershot, UK: Dartmouth Publishing 
Company, 1995. 
125 
McLeod, William T., The New Collins Dictionary and Thesaurus (London: William 
Collins Sons and Co Ltd, 1987). 
Mearsheimer, J.J., "The False Promise of International Institutions", International 
Security no. 16, 1994-1995. 
Munton, Don; Kirton, John, Canadian Foreign Policy (Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice-Hall 
Canada Inc., 1994. 
Nerlich, Uwe, "Die NATO als Kernstuck einer europaischen Sicherheitsstruktur", 
Europa-Archiv vol. 49, no. 17 (September 10, 1994). 
North Atlantic Council, "Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council at 
Turnberry", NATO Review vol. 38, no. 3, 1990. 
North Atlantic Council, "Ministerial Meeting, Denmark", NATO Review vol. 39, 
no. 3, 1991. 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO- Facts and Figures (Brussels: NATO 
Information Service, 1969). 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Brussels: 
NATO Information Service, 1989). 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, The London Declaration on a Transformed Alliance 
(Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1990), The London Summit in July, 1990. 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, The Framework Document for Partnership for Peace 
(Brussels, 1994 ). 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Handbook (Brussels: NATO Office of 
Information and Press, 1995). 
Papacosma, S. Victor, Heiss, Mary Ann, NATO in the Post-Cold War Era, Does it Have a 
Future? (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995). 
Park, William, Defending the West (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986). 
Peterson, Olof, Makt i det oppna samhallet (Stockholm: Carlsson Bokforlag, 1991). 
Pierce, Lisa, National Model United Nations 1995- North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
New York, 1995. 
126 
Powell, Colin, "The Eisenhower Centenary Lecture: Military Realities and Future 
Security Prospects", RUSI Journal vol. 136, no. 1, 1991. 
Reid, Escott, "Forming the North Atlantic Alliance, 1949" in Don Munton and John 
Kirton, Canadian Foreign Policy (Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice-Hall Canada Inc., 
1994). 
Rengger, Nicholas,(ed.) Treaties and Alliances of the World (Harlow, Essex, UK: 
Longman Group UK Limited, 1990). 
Roche, Douglas, "From Conflict to Community", in C.G. Jacobsen, M. Miller, 
M. Spencer, and E.L. Tollefson, World Security- The New Challenge (Toronto: 
Canadian Pugwash Group, 1994). 
Rogers, J. Philip, The Future of European Security (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993). 
Rogers, J. Philip, "Introduction: An Era of Revolutionary Change" in (ed.) J. Philip 
Rogers, The Future of European Security (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993). 
Roos , Martina (ed.), NATO, Vasteuropeiska Unionen (Stockholm: Utrikespolitiska 
Institutet, 1994 (August). 
Schulzinger, Robert D., American Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1994). 
Schwabe, Klaus, "The Origins of the United States' Engagement in Europe, 1946-1952", 
in Francis H. Heller and John R. Gillingham, NATO: The Founding of the 
Atlantic Alliance and the Integration of Europe (New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1992). 
Seidelmann, R., "Towards a Common European Security Policy" in Cristoph Bluth, Emil 
Kirchner, and James Sperling, The Future of European Security (Aldershot, UK: 
Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1995). 
Shelley, Louise 1., "Post-Soviet Organized Crime: A New Form of Authoritarianism", 
Transnational Organized Crime vol. 2, no. 2/3, 1996 (Summer/Autumn). 
Sloan, Stanley R. , "NATO and the United States", in (eds.) S. Victor Papacosma and 
Mary Ann Heiss, NATO in the Post-Cold War Era, Does it Have a Future? (New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1995). 
Sloan, Stanley R., NATO's Future: Beyond Collective Defense Report released 
September 15, 1995 (marvin.nc3a.nato.int:70/00/secdeflind/natofutr.asc ). 
127 
Smoke, Richard, (ed.) Perceptions of Security (New York: Manchester University Press, 
1996). 
Solana, Javier, "Renewing the Transatlantic Partnership: NATO Confronts the Next 
Century" (speech), Washington D.C.: Georgetown University, 1996 
(20 February). 
Solana, Javier,"Shaping NATO for the 21st Century", NATO Review vol. 45, 
no. 1, 1997 (January). 
Szilagyi, Zsofia, "Hungary Continues Presenting Its Case at the Hague", OMRI 
Publications no. 46, March 6, 1997. 
Taubman, William, Stalin's American Policy: From Entente to Detente to Cold War 
(New York, 1992). 
Taylor, Trevor, European Security and the Former Soviet Union (London: The Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, 1994 ). 
Ullman, Richard H., Securing Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991). 
US Department of Defense, United States Security Strategy for Europe and NATO 
Washington D.C. : Department of Defense, Office of International Security 
Affairs, June 1995). 
van Staden, Alfred, "A Lasting Alliance? On the Creation, Evolution, and Future of 
NATO", Acta Politica vol. 30, no. 3, 1995 (July). 
von Moltke, Gebhardt, "NATO Moves Towards Enlargement", NATO Review vol. 44, 
no. 1, 1996 (January). 
Walt, Stephen M., The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987). 
Waltz, Kenneth N., Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979). 
Weaver, Ole, "Securitization and Desecuritization" in Ronnie D. Lipschutz, On Security 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1995). 
Wiggershaus, Norbert, Forester, Roland G. (eds.), The Western Security Community, 
1948-1950 (Providence, USA: Berg Publishers, 1993). 
Williams, Phil, "CFE and the Future of NATO", in (ed.) J. Philip Rogers, The Future of 
European Security (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1993). 
128 
Woyke, Wichard, "Foundation and History of NATO, 1948-1950" in Norbert 
Wiggershaus and Roland G. Forester, The Western Security Community, 1948-
1950 (Providence, USA: Berg Publishers, 1993). 
Worner, Manfred, "The Atlantic Alliance and European Security in the 1990s" (speech) 
(Brussels: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, May 17, 1990). 
Yerex, William, "The North Atlantic Cooperation Council: NATO's Ostpolitik for Post-
Cold War Europe", in (eds.) David G. Haglund, S. Neil MacFarlane, Joel J. 
Sokolsky, NATO's Eastern Dilemmas (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc., 
1994). 
Zelikow, Philip, "The Masque of Institutions", Survival - The IISS Quarterly vol. 38, 
no. 1, 1996 (Spring). 
129 
Newspaper Articles/Magazine Articles 
Braconier, Fredrik, "Nato behruler sin handlingsfrihet", Svenska Dagbladet May 16, 
1997, sec. World News. 
Braconier, Fredrik, "Ryssland-Nato eniga om avtal", Svenska Dagbladet May 15, 1997, 
sec. World News. 
Brors, Henrik, "Nato expanderar osterut", Smalandstidningen December 11, 1996. 
Carlbom, Mats, "Natos framtid blir ett natverk av allianser", Dagens Nyheter November 
20, 1993, sec. World News. 
Green, Jerold D.; Larrabee, F. Stephen; Lesser, Ian o., "NATO is Looking South, and 
Mideast Peace Stands to Gain", International Herald Tribune January 18, 1995. 
Hagwall, Hakan, "Nato fick lite fart pa Nordiska Radet", Svenska Dagbladet November 
13, 1996. 
Henriksson, Karin, "Natoutvidgning trots ryskt missnoje", Svenska Dagbladet 
March 22, 1997. 
Holmstrom, Mikael, "USA ser Sverige som nyckelpartner", Svenska Dagbladet 
August 18, 1996. 
Holmstrom, Mikael, "Tidtabell klar for utvidgat Nato", Svenska Dagbladet 
December 11, 1996. 
Holmstrom, Mikael, "Ryssland valjer forsonlig linje mot Nato", Svenska Dagbladet 
December 12, 1996. 
Holmstrom, Mikael, "Nato beskylls for anfallsplaner", Svenska Dagbladet January 29, 
1997, sec. Domestic News. 
Holmstrom, Mikael, "Skugga over historisk dag for Nato", Svenska Dagbladet July 8, 
1997, sec. World News. 
Holmstrom, Mikael, "Nato enades om utvidgningen", Svenska Dagbladet July 9, 1997 
sec. World News, p. 7. 
Holmstrom, Mikael, "Ett nytt samarbete skapas i Europa", Svenska Dagbladet July 11, 
1997, sec. World News. 
130 
International Herald Tribune, "West Germans Shrug in a Poll", International Herald 
Tribune October 25, 1988. 
Kissinger, Henry, "NATOs roll ar annu inte overspelad", Svenska Dagbladet 
August 27, 1994. 
Marshall, Tyler, "Kriget i Tjetjenien paverkar Vasteuropas forsvar", Tempus March 14-
20, 1996. 
"Rethinking NATO", The Economist May 25, 1991. 
Rostrup Lundquist, Carin, "Ar det dags att skrota Nato?", Helsingborgs Dagblad 
November 18, 1990. 
"Serb Civilians Scurry for Cover as NATO Jets Step up Bombing", The 
Vancouver Sun September 8, 1995. 
Svegfors, Mats, "Mera spanskt i Nato", Svenska Dagbladet November 16, 1996. 
Svegfors, Mats, "Nato vaxer och nlirmar sig", Svenska Dagbladet December 12, 1996. 
TT-Reuter, "USA valkomnar baiter i Nato", Svenska Dagbladet October 10, 1996. 
TT-AFP, "Frostiga samtal om utvidgning av Nato", Smalandstidningen January 21, 1997, 
sec. World News. 
TT-AFP, "Nato utvidgar till Nordafrika", Svenska Dagbladet October 12, 1996. 
Walesa, Lech, "Wary of a Weakened Russia, Walesa Urges NATO Expansion", 
The Globe and Mail March 14, 1997, sec. International News. 
York, Geoffrey, "Russia, NATO Reach Accord", The Globe and Mail May 15, 1997. 
131 
Appendix 1 
The North Atlantic Treaty 
Washington D.C., 4 Apri11949 
The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United 
Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments. 
They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their 
peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. 
They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area. 
They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of 
peace and security. 
They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty: 
ARTICLE 1 
The Parties undertake, as set forth in the charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in 
which they may be involved by peaceful means in such manner that international peace and security, and 
justice, are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in 
any manner inconsistent with the purposes ot the United Nations. 
ARTICLE 2 
The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations 
by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon 
which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will 
seek to eliminate conflict in their international policies and will encourage economic collaboration between 
any or all of them. 
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ARTICLE3 
In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by 
means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and 
collective capacity to resist armed attack. 
ARTICLE4 
The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political 
independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened. 
ARTICLE 5 
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be 
considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each 
of them in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the 
Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually 
and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to 
restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. 
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be 
reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken 
the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security. 
ARTICLE 61 
For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed 
attack: 
on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian 
Departments of France2, on the territory of Turkey or on the islands under the jurisdiction 
of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic Cancer; 
1 As ammended by Article 2 of the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of Greece and Turkey. 
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on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or 
any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on 
the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic 
area north of the Tropic Cancer. 
ARTICLE7 
The Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting, in any way the rights and obligations 
under the charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of 
the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security. 
ARTICLES 
Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the 
Parties or any third state is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any 
international engagement in conflict with this Treaty. 
ARTICLE9 
The Parties hereby establish a council , on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters 
concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The council shall be so organised as to be able to meet 
promptly at any time. The council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it 
shall establish immediately a defence committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation 
of Articles 3 and 5. 
ARTICLE /0 
The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European state in a position to further the 
principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. 
Any state so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the 
Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform 
each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession. 
2 On 16 January 1963, the Council noted that insofar as the former Algerian Departments of France were 
concerned, the relevant clauses of this Treaty had become inapplicable as from 3 July 1962. 
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ARTICLE 11 
This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective 
constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the 
Government of the United States of America, which will notify all the other signatories of each deposit. The 
Treaty shall enter into force between the states which have ratified it as soon as the ratifications of the 
majority of the signatories, including the ratifications of Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, have been deposited and shall come into effect 
with respect to other states on the date of the deposit of their ratifications? 
ARTICLE 12 
After the Treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time thereafter, the Parties shall, if any of them so 
requests, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty, having regard for the factors then 
affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area, including the development of universal as well as 
regional arrangements under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace 
and security. 
ARTICLE 13 
After the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a party one year after its 
notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the United States of America, which will 
inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation. 
ARTICLE 14 
This Treaty, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives 
of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies thereof will be transmitted by that 
Government to the Governments of the other signatories. 
3 The Treaty came into force on 24 August 1949, after the deposit of the ratifications of all signatory states. 
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Appendix 3 
NATO's New Structures 
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Source: North Atlantic Treaty 
NATO Handbook (Brussels: NATO 
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